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Do Prison Conditions Change How Much
Punishment A Sentence Carries Out?
Lessons From Federal Sentence
Reduction Rulings During the COVID-19
Pandemic
Skylar Albertson*
ABSTRACT
A set of motions filed during the COVID-19 pandemic challenged federal judges to
consider whether they should always view the duration of imprisonment—as contrasted
with prison conditions—as the sole determinant of how much punishment a sentence
carries out. Under 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), federal judges may “reduce” already
imposed terms of imprisonment upon finding that “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
warrant reductions. Prior to 2019, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) effectively controlled the
scope of a catch-all subcategory of “Other Reasons” justifying sentence reductions. The
BOP used this authority almost exclusively for people who were in the final stages of
terminal illness. The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) amended § 3582(c) in a manner that
freed federal judges to decide for themselves what types of circumstances meet the
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard. The FSA also authorized people in
federal custody to file motions on their own behalf, instead of permitting only the Director
of the BOP to do so. Roughly a year later, the COVID-19 pandemic prompted the increased
use of lockdowns and other restrictions inside U.S. prisons. Among the many thousands of
people who moved for sentence reductions, several hundred argued that imprisonment with
these new restrictions amounted to a greater punishment than pre-pandemic imprisonment.
This Article explores the lessons that the decisions adjudicating these motions offer for the
design of sentencing laws—including second looks—as well as efforts to increase
transparency surrounding life inside prisons.
Keywords: sentence reductions, prison conditions, punitive effect, lockdowns, second
looks, COVID-19, First Step Act of 2018, sentencing, compassionate release
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2020, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) imposed a nationwide
lockdown as part of its response to the COVID-19 pandemic.1 The BOP’s first press release
describing this lockdown announced that “the Bureau [had] instituted significant
measures,” including “temporary restrictions on visitation, restricting inmate movement to
only required and mission-essential transfers,” and “a mandatory 14-day quarantine” for
all people entering custody.2
Through lockdowns and other restrictions, the BOP’s pandemic response upended
life in prison, as did responses in state and local corrections systems. By some accounts,
the BOP’s initial lockdown confined people to their cells for nearly all hours of the day.3
Medical and mental health care, visitation, group programs, and other aspects of prison life
1

Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Bureau of Prisons Update on COVID-19 (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/20200324_bop_press_release_covid19_update.pdf.
2
Id.
3
See, e.g., United States v. Regas, 3:91-cr-00057-MMD-NA-1-57, 2020 WL 2926457, at *3 (D. Nev. June
3, 2020) (“Defendant is isolated in his cell for 22.5 hours a day, despite his elderly age and good
behavior.”).
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also underwent dramatic restrictions or suspensions.4
Although the simultaneity of these measures in prisons across the United States was
a unique result of the pandemic, similar restrictions occurred before the pandemic and will
continue in the future. For example, a 2014 investigation revealed that a jail on New York
City’s Rikers Island was “frequently . . . placed in locked down status.”5 In January 2022,
the BOP placed the entire federal prison system on “a nationwide lockdown” in response
to a deadly fight at a federal prison in Texas.6
These types of restrictions changed what it meant to serve a prison sentence. They
illustrated that changes in conditions of confinement can alter the experience of
imprisonment in a profound manner. As one judge observed, “[a] day spent in prison under
extreme lockdown and a legitimate fear of contracting a once-in-a-century deadly virus
exacts a price on a prisoner beyond that imposed by an ordinary day in prison.”7
When prison conditions undergo these types of changes, does the amount of
punishment that a prison sentence carries out change as well? This question has
implications for laws requiring that criminal sentences be parsimonious and proportionate.
In the federal sentencing system, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) commands judges to construct
sentences that are “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”8
A 2018 amendment to the federal sentence reduction statute and the arrival of the
COVID-19 pandemic combined to create a perfect storm that invited judges to consider
whether changes in prison conditions can ever increase how much punishment a prison
sentence effects (a sentence’s “punitive effect”). Some judges concluded that, in fact,
conditions of confinement do play a role in determining punitive effect. In the words of the
Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit, “[t]here is good reason to believe that, in some cases, a
sentence that was ‘sufficient but not greater than necessary’ before the coronavirus
pandemic may no longer meet that criteria,” because “[a] day in prison under the current
conditions is a qualitatively different type of punishment than one day in prison used to
be.”9
The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) broadened the availability of sentence reductions
under the federal sentence reduction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), just thirteen months
4

See, e.g., United States v. Hatcher, No. 18-CR-454-10 (KPF), 2021 WL 1535310, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
19, 2021) (“[T]he Court did not envision [S.H.] to serve this term of imprisonment in near-total lockdown,
without the mental health and other support programs that the Court believes to be critical to her health and
ability to reenter society.”).
5
U.S. ATT’Y S. DIST. N.Y., DEP’T OF JUST., CRIPA INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTION JAILS ON RIKERS ISLAND 8 (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usaosdny/legacy/2015/03/25/SDNY%20Rikers%20Report.pdf [hereinafter CRIPA INVESTIGATION].
6
Katie Benner, Fatal Gang Fight Spurts Nationwide Lockdown of Federal Prison System, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
31, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/31/us/politics/ms13-texas-prison-fight.html.
7
United States v. Robles, 553 F. Supp. 3d 172, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting United States v. Lizardi, No.
11 Cr. 1032-55 (PAE), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188147, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2020)); see also
Colleen McMahon, (Re)Views from the Bench: A Judicial Perspective on Second-Look Sentencing in the
Federal System, 58 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1617, 1623 (2020) (“COVID presented the perfect exceptional and
compelling circumstance—potentially a life or death issue when it arises, even though, for most prisoners,
it will never arise; an issue that can impact the severity of a sentence even when a prisoner is not sickened
by it, both because of the fear factor and because of the isolation that the BOP is imposing on prisoners in
an understandable effort to keep the virus from entering or spreading through federal correctional
institutions . . . .”).
8
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
9
United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 335 (4th Cir. 2021) (Gregory, C.J., concurring).
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before the COVID-19 pandemic spread to the United States. Subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) of this
statute permits courts to “reduce” federal prison sentences if “extraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant such a reduction.”10 If a person is eligible for a sentence reduction, the
court weighs the factors applicable for initial sentencing hearings, codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), to determine whether to grant a reduction, and, if so, the size of the reduction.11
These factors include a set of sentencing purposes, such as “the need . . . to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant” and “provide just punishment,” as well as
other considerations, such as “the nature and circumstances of the offense.”12 The FSA
shifted § 3582(c) from funneling all motions for sentence reductions by people in federal
prisons through the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), who previously granted very
few reductions,13 to authorizing over 600 federal district judges to grant reductions without
the BOP’s approval.14
In addition, the FSA’s amendments to § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) opened the door to more
expansive interpretations of the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard. Prior to
2018, the BOP controlled the scope of a catch-all subcategory of “Other Reasons”
justifying sentence reductions. During this time, the BOP focused on releasing people in
the final stages of terminal illness and supported reductions for fewer than thirty people
per year.15 After the enactment of the FSA, eleven federal appellate circuits held that §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i)’s amended text authorized federal district judges to decide for themselves
what “extraordinary and compelling reasons” means. In other words, federal judges in
much of the country were “freed . . . to consider the full slate of extraordinary and
compelling reasons that an imprisoned person might bring before them.”16
Not all judges adopted the view that changed prison conditions could justify sentence
reductions under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Indeed, most did not. Some judges rejected these types
of arguments altogether, reasoning that civil rights actions were the proper vehicles for
complaints related to conditions of confinement.17 Others concluded that changes in prison
conditions were not “extraordinary” if they affected most or all people in custody.18
However, many judges did endorse some form of the proposition that prison
10

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Id. §§ 3553(a)(1), 3582(c)(1)(A). As discussed below, the text of § 3582(c) does not state that reductions
must result in immediate release. See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020) (“It bears
remembering that compassionate release is a misnomer. 18 § 3582(c)(1)(A) in fact speaks of sentence
reductions. A district court could, for instance, reduce but not eliminate a defendant’s prison sentence, or
end the term of imprisonment but impose a significant term of probation or supervised release in its
place.”).
12
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
13
EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS DIV., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FEDERAL BUREAU
OF PRISONS’ COMPASSIONATE RELEASE PROGRAM 1 (Apr. 2013),
https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/e1306.pdf [hereinafter EVALUATION &
INSPECTIONS DIV.]
14
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), with First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–391, § 603, 132 Stat.
5194, 5239 (2018).
15
See EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS DIV., supra note 13.
16
Brooker, 976 F.3d at 237.
17
E.g., United States v. Carrera, No. 3:14-CR-367-B-40, 2020 WL 7225997, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7,
2020) (“Insofar as [J.C.] seeks judicial review of his conditions of confinement, including the sufficiency of
the medical care he is receiving in prison, he may file a civil-rights complaint.” (internal citations omitted)).
18
E.g., United States v. Thomas, No. 3:17-CR-51 (SLG), 2021 WL 3924724, at *1 (D. Alaska Sept. 1,
2021).
11
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conditions can change how much punishment a sentence carries out. Some of these judges
concluded that changed prison conditions were proper grounds for reductions under §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i) to the extent that they exacerbated specific infirmities or interfered with
treatment.19 The judges who authored these rulings appeared to treat § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) as
a provision for compassionate release, a term that generally refers to release from prison
for reasons related to aging or medical ailments.20 Their approach is consistent with the
idea that changed prison conditions are among the set of “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” justifying sentence reductions, but it supplied a limiting principle for eligibility.
Although the words “compassionate release” are absent from the text of § 3582(c),
aspects of § 3582(c)’s text provide some support for this interpretation. For example,
subsection (1)(A)(ii) of § 3582(c), which authorizes reductions for people who are at least
seventy years old and have served at least thirty years in prison, closely aligns with the idea
of compassionate release.21 In addition, Congress labeled the section of the FSA that
amended § 3582(c) “Increasing the Use and Transparency of Compassionate Release.”22
However, as one federal appellate court observed, compassionate release may be “a
misnomer,” because “§ 3582(c)(1)(A) in fact speaks of sentence reductions,” as opposed
to immediate release.23
Consistent with this broader characterization of § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s scope, some
judges treated changes in prison conditions as cognizable under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) without
requiring a close fit to a specific ailment. These judges viewed changes in prison conditions
during the pandemic as interfering with earlier pairings of culpability and punishment at
pre-pandemic initial sentencings—whether or not such changes related to specific medical
or mental health conditions or to age.24 What were once fair sentences had become unfair,
and reductions provided these judges with a tool for rebalancing sentences.
Read together, the rulings yield lessons for the design of sentencing systems and,
in particular, for the challenges of reconsidering prison sentences. Laws in the United
States narrowly circumscribe the situations in which courts may revisit sentencing
decisions.25 This principle of finality promotes certain goals, such as the preservation of

19

E.g., United States v. Chavis, No. 1:18-CR-481-3, 2021 WL 2784653, at *1–2 (M.D.N.C. July 2, 2021)
(stating that “[M.C.] has had a uniquely difficult time during his incarceration because of his ulcerative
colitis, the delay in diagnosis, and the COVID-19 pandemic,” and that “[t]he deterrent and punitive effect
of serving a sentence under these conditions is significantly increased”).
20
See generally Renagh O’Leary, Compassionate Release and Decarceration in the States, 107 IOWA L.
REV. 621, 635–40 (2022); Mary Price, Everywhere and Nowhere: Compassionate Release in the States,
FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS (June 2018), https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/ExecSummary-Report.pdf.
21
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).
22
First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018).
23
United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020).
24
See infra Part I.B.4.
25
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b) (providing that “a judgment of conviction that includes . . . a sentence
constitutes a final judgment for all other purposes” aside from sentence reductions pursuant to § 3582(c),
appeals pursuant to § 3742, and corrections pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35). Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 permits, “[w]ithin 14 days after sentencing,” corrections of “arithmetical,
technical, or other clear error[s],” and reductions for “substantial assistance” to the government. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 35; cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 255 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (referencing
“[t]he respect shown under common law for the finality of the judgment of a committing court at the time
of the Constitution and in the early 19th century”).
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judicial resources.26 For several reasons, including the high number of people imprisoned
in the United States, interest in expanding the availability of provisions permitting
reconsideration—known as “second looks”—is increasing.27 For example, in 2017, the
reporters of the Model Penal Code proposed authorizing judges to revisit any prison
sentence after fifteen years have passed. 28
Crafting second looks raises layers of difficult questions, including whether, why,
when, and how to make them available.29 The sentence reduction rulings discussing
changes in federal prisons during the COVID-19 pandemic bear on each of these questions.
The rulings suggest that one potential consideration when revisiting sentences, or one
potential ground for initiating reconsideration, is the set of prison conditions that a person
has endured while incarcerated. Importantly, the rulings reveal that some judges will be
inclined to account for changed prison conditions in this manner, even in the absence of
express authorization. The fact that even a small proportion of federal district judges
adopted this view—judges responsible for regularly handing down sentences face-toface—should prompt legislators and others involved in the design of sentencing practices
to give serious consideration to this understanding of the relationship between prison
conditions and punitive effect.
Unlike initial sentencing proceedings, second looks prompt judges to assess
sentences at a time when information about a person’s actual experience in prison is
available. Most of the judges who granted § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions were the same judges
who had imposed initial sentences in these cases. Upon learning about what people had
endured in prison during the COVID-19 pandemic, many judges expressed that they would
have imposed shorter prison terms had they been able to foresee these hardships.30 Their
26

See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378,
383–84 (1964) (listing “finality considerations”); see also Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Another Look at
Second-Look Sentencing, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 169 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he best juncture for
assessing the seriousness of an offense is the point in time at which the crime was committed” because
“[t]he crime was committed against the public at that time . . . not against the current public”).
27
See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 26, at 158–61; Richard Frase, Second Look Provisions in the Proposed Model
Penal Code Revisions, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 195–200 (2009); Shon Hopwood, Second Looks & Second
Chances, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 93–99 (2019); Nazgol Ghandnoosh, A Second Look at Injustice, SENT’G
PROJECT 4 (2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/a-second-look-atinjustice/?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=8fe84748-5d26-4ab8-b029-16fae4e3f957 (“Legislators in 25
states, including Minnesota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Florida, have recently introduced second look
bills.”).
28
MODEL PENAL CODE, app. A: Principles for Legislation § 305.6 cmt. b. (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final
Draft Apr. 10, 2017). The reporters’ reasons for this proposal included that, “[a]t the time of the [proposal] .
. . the per capita incarceration rate in the United States was the highest in the world,” and that
“governments should be especially cautious in the use of . . . penalties that deprive offenders of their liberty
for a substantial portion of their adult lives.” Id.
29
See, e.g., Frase, supra note 27, at 200 (asking whether “even a narrow second look option [would] unduly
burden courts and counsel resources,” “a narrow second look provision [would] prove illusory or freakish
in practice,” and “even narrow provisions [would] undermine front-end impact assessments and
accountability?”).
30
See, e.g., United States v. Newell, Nos. 1:13-CR-165-1, 1:15-CR-362-1, 1:13-CR-214-2, 2021 WL
3269650, at *13 (M.D.N.C. July 30, 2021), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v. Burr, No. 21-7193,
2021 WL 9299047 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 2021) (“[T]he conditions of confinement during this time were
substantially more punitive than was contemplated at the time of sentencing.”); United States v. Hatcher,
No. 18-CR-454-10 (KPF), 2021 WL 1535310, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2021) (“[T]he Court did not
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reactions underscore that, to the extent that prison conditions are understood as a
determinant of punitive effect, refraining from any response amounts to a choice to tolerate
variations that may render sentence duration a less meaningful measure of the severity of
punishment—in other words, a choice to tolerate changes in punitive effect that are not
captured in sentence length.
In this way, the decisions reveal that whether to understand prison conditions as a
determinant of punitive effect is an important system design choice—and one for which
the current federal sentencing scheme does not provide a definitive answer. On the one
hand, federal statutes’ designation of imprisonment as a single type of penalty might
suggest that judges should not view changes in prison conditions as altering punitive effect.
Yet, the text of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) complicates this analysis. The statute’s “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” standard suggests a broad, equitable power to revisit sentences.
Moreover, the availability of probation and supervised release as components of sentences
in the federal system underscores that the duration of a penalty is not the sole determinant
of its punitive effect.
The rulings also illustrate that reducing sentences in response to changes in prison
conditions invites significant implementation challenges. Although the basic proposition
that conditions of confinement bear on punitive effect might appear simple, quantifying
these changes in terms of days, weeks, or months is highly subjective. The rulings do not
reflect an organized framework regarding which people should receive sentence
reductions, of what size, and in response to what types of changes. For this reason, whether
a given system should use sentence reductions to respond to changes in prison conditions
is a challenging question that does not yield easy answers.
The clearest takeaway from the rulings is an urgent need to increase transparency
concerning life inside prisons. In particular, the rulings illustrate that judges viewed
changes related to lockdowns, medical and mental health care, and social contact as altering
punitive effect. Collecting data on these aspects of life inside prisons is a prerequisite for
making informed decisions about whether to offer sentence reductions in these
circumstances. When “the practical and philosophical problems of developing a coherent
sentencing system” threatened to stymie the creation of the first Federal Guidelines
Manual, the U.S. Sentencing Commission turned to an “empirical approach”—effectively
reverse-engineering much of the Guidelines from past sentencing data.31 Similarly, it is
only through broad, ongoing data collection that a legislature or government agency could
fully understand the problems that sentence reductions responding to prison conditions
would seek to address. Even in systems that choose not to make sentence reductions
available for changed prison conditions, minimizing such changes should remain a priority,
so that people who formally receive the same penalty are unlikely to experience objectively

envision [S.H.] to serve this term of imprisonment in near-total lockdown, without the mental health and
other support programs that the Court believes to be critical to her health and ability to reenter society.”);
United States v. Pacheco, No. 12-CR-408 (JMF), 2020 WL 4350257, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2020) (“On
February 12, 2020, the Court found that an eight-month sentence was sufficient, but no greater than
necessary, to achieve the purposes of sentencing,” but “[t]he balance weighs differently . . . in the current
circumstances.”); United States v. Mel, No. 18-CR-571 (TDC), 2020 WL 2041674, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 28,
2020) (“Indeed, the actual severity of the sentence as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak exceeds what the
Court anticipated at the time of sentencing.”).
31
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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different punishments.32
As of August 2022, the U.S. Sentencing Commission has a quorum for the first time
in over three years.33 Pursuant to 28 U.S. § 991, the Commission is responsible for
“establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system”
and “develop[ing] means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and
correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in
section 3553(a)(2).”34 In October 2022, the Commission published its priorities for
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines and listed updates to the policy statement on
sentence reductions first.35 As part of this effort, the Commission should develop a plan for
an informed, deliberate approach to assessing whether sentence reductions should ever take
prison conditions into account. To begin this process, the Commission should gather data
on lockdowns, the delivery of medical and mental healthcare, and social contact in BOP
facilities. Congress, the BOP, and the Sentencing Commission should also give serious
consideration to using standardized sentence credits to grant reductions for time spent in
facility- or unit-wide lockdowns. For aspects of prison that are less readily measurable, the
Sentencing Commission should consider providing judges with ranges of recommended
reductions. Even if the Sentencing Commission concludes that changed prison conditions
are not proper bases for reductions, the Commission should work with Congress and the
BOP to develop metrics for tracking significant fluctuations in certain prison conditions.
Part I of this Article summarizes the history of the federal sentence reduction statute,
including the 2018 amendments that were part of the FSA. Part I then surveys the different
approaches that federal judges employed in response to sentence reduction motions citing
changed prison conditions as grounds for relief. Part II examines the choices and challenges
these rulings unearthed for the design of sentencing systems. Part II then explores how
these rulings recast efforts to increase transparency surrounding prison conditions as
related to the fairness of sentences.
I. THE FEDERAL SENTENCE REDUCTION STATUTE & THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC
The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) amended the federal sentence reduction statute in
a manner that opened the door to more expansive understandings of who should receive
reductions and for what reasons, just thirteen months before the arrival of the COVID-19
pandemic in the United States. These convergent shocks to the federal sentencing system
set the stage for judges to consider whether they should view changes in prison conditions
as altering the punitive effect of prison sentences.
32

This Article focuses on changes in prison conditions that alter the objective experience of prison—for
example, isolation in a cell for twenty-two hours per day with limited social contact is an objectively
different day-to-day experience than being able to leave one’s cell for most of the day and interact with
other people. This Article does not argue that two people with different subjective experiences of the same
restrictions receive different punishments. However, the Author of this Article also acknowledges that how
to define the line between subjective and objective experiences of imprisonment is not always clear.
33
Press Release, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Acting Chair Judge Charles Breyer, Incoming Chair Judge Carlton
W. Reeves Applaud Senate Confirmation of New Commissioners (Aug. 5, 2022),
https://www.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/august-5-2022 [hereinafter Applaud Senate Confirmation].
34
28 U.S.C. § 991.
35
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FINAL PRIORITIES FOR AMENDMENT CYCLE (Nov. 9, 2022), at 2–3.
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A. The Federal Sentence Reduction Statute Before the First Step Act of 2018
The contemporary federal sentence reduction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), has
authorized judges to “reduce” prison sentences since 1987. Legislative history regarding
this provision is sparse, but it indicates that at least some members of Congress viewed §
3582(c) as a “safety valve” to counterbalance new laws eliminating federal parole and
requiring people to serve larger portions of their sentences in prison. For many years,
however, very few people obtained relief under this provision. From 1987 until late 2018,
the BOP possessed sole authority to move for sentence reductions under § 3582(c).
Moreover, the U.S. Sentencing Commission entrusted the BOP with defining the catch-all
category of “Other Reasons” that could justify reductions. During this time, the BOP used
this authority almost exclusively for people in the final stages of terminal illness.36
When § 3582(c) was enacted in 1984,37 it created a mechanism for revisiting prison
sentences at a time when Congress was overhauling the federal sentencing system to make
prison terms more “determinate.”38 From 1910 until the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
(SRA) took effect in 1987, the portion of a federal criminal sentence that a person served
in prison, i.e., the “term of imprisonment,” was not fixed at the time of sentencing.39
Instead, people serving federal sentences could obtain release from prison to parole
supervision after serving a minimum term of imprisonment. For most offenses, this
minimum term of imprisonment was one-third of the total term of imprisonment.40 For
example, a person sentenced to three years in prison in 1980 would become eligible for
parole in 1981, one year into the three-year term of imprisonment. A federal agency, the
U.S. Parole Commission, was responsible for adjudicating parole requests.
Under the version of the federal parole system in place between 1976 and the
implementation of the SRA, people who had not yet completed their minimum terms of
imprisonment could nevertheless obtain immediate release to parole if both the BOP and
their sentencing courts supported their release. Title 18, Section 4205(g), which the SRA
repealed, provided that, “[a]t any time upon motion of the Bureau of Prisons, the court may
reduce any minimum term to the time the defendant has served.”41 The legislative history
36

See EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS DIV., supra note 13, at 1–2.
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 1998 (1984).
38
But see Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 960, 1016 (2013) (arguing that “supervised release, as it has evolved, has usurped the
determinacy revolution by making federal prison terms ‘indeterminate,’ or indefinite, in length” because,
“[i]n practical terms, given the possibility of revocation, and the frequency of reimprisonment, no one who
receives supervised release receives a determinate sentence,” and “almost everyone receives supervised
release”); see also Kevin R. Reitz, Edward E. Rhine, Allegra Lukac, & Melanie Griffith, American PrisonRelease Systems, ROBINA INST. 1 (Apr. 2022),
https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/2022-05/american_ prisonrelease_systems.pdf (summarizing the “mechanics of indeterminacy”). Whether or not the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 succeeded in making the federal sentencing system determinate, it is clear that the Act
was intended to create a more determinate system. See Doherty, supra note 38, at 996 (“Federal parole was
consigned history, inaugurating a new era of determinate sentencing—or so everyone believed at the time.”
(citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221)).
39
See 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (repealed 1987); see generally Doherty, supra note 38, at 984–90; ISAAC
FULWOOD, U.S. PAROLE COMM’N, DEP’T OF JUST., HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 1–34 (May
2003), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/uspc/legacy/2009/10/07/history.pdf.
40
18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (repealed 1987).
41
Id. § 4205(g).
37
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of § 4205(g) offers little guidance as to how Congress envisioned that the BOP and courts
would exercise this power,42 and it is unclear how many people obtained release in this
manner.43
The SRA replaced the federal parole system with a more determinate sentencing
scheme. People who received federal prison sentences would now be required to serve the
entirety, or—after application of sentence credits for “satisfactory behavior”—close to the
entirety of their terms of imprisonment behind bars.44 Judges could also impose terms of
supervised release, which begin upon a person’s release from prison.45 Proponents of these
changes offered varying reasons for the shift to more determinate sentences, including that
indeterminate sentences permitted people who had committed serious harm to leave prison
before receiving sufficient punishment,46 and that the broad discretion wielded by the U.S.
Parole Commission led to unfair and racially disparate outcomes.47
Although the SRA eliminated federal parole, it also created new mechanisms for
modifying the duration of already-imposed federal prison terms. As noted above, the Act
provided for “credit[s] . . . for satisfactory behavior,” or what are known colloquially as
42

See Bryant S. Green, Comment, As the Pendulum Swings: The Reformation of Compassionate Release to
Accommodate Changing Perceptions of Corrections, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 123, 126 (2014) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 94-838, at 20 (1975)). The Bureau of Prisons would later refer to § 4205(g) as “compassionate
release.” See EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS DIV., supra note 13, at 1. However, the term “compassionate
release” is absent from the text of § 4205(g). Moreover, there were some instances in the late 1970s when
the BOP moved for, and courts granted, release under this provision for non-medical reasons, such as
sentencing disparities between co-defendants and positive behavior in prison. See Hopwood, supra note 27,
at 100–01 (citing United States v. Diaco, 457 F. Supp. 371, 375 (D.N.J. 1978) and United States v. Banks,
428 F. Supp. 1088, 1089 (E.D. Mich. 1977)).
43
As discussed below, a report by the Department of Justice’s Inspector General found that, “on average,
only 24 inmates [were] released each year through the BOP’s compassionate release program” from 2006
through 2011. EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS DIV., supra note 13, at 1. During these years, the BOP’s
“compassionate release program” relied on both § 4205(g) and § 3582(c). Although the SRA repealed §
4205(g), this provision still applies to sentences imposed before 1987. Id. It is not clear whether there is
publicly accessible data showing how many people received release under § 4205(g) before the SRA went
into effect in 1987.
44
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2007 (1984).
45
Id. at 1999. Violations of the conditions of supervised release can result in new terms of imprisonment.
Initially, a court needed to “treat a violation of a condition of a term of supervised release as contempt of
court” in order to re-imprison a person. Id. at 2000. However, federal law now authorizes a court to
“require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute . .
. if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of
supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
46
See Doherty, supra note 38, at 991–95.
47
See id. at 991; Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227 (1993) (“Beginning in the 1950s,
liberal reformers developed three fundamental criticisms of the prevailing regime of indeterminate prison
sentencing and parole,” including that indeterminate sentencing “was . . . fundamentally at odds with ideals
of equality and the rule of law,” because “permitting judges and parole officials to exercise unguided
discretion assertedly resulted in ‘unwarranted disparity’ (including alleged bias against minorities) in
criminal sentences.”); see also Race and Noncapital Sentencing, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1626, 1627 (1988)
(“Like capital sentencing systems, most noncapital systems are rife with racial bias. To reduce the potential
for racial discrimination in the sentencing process, states should establish sentencing systems that curb or
eliminate discretionary procedures.”). Racially disparate parole outcomes continue to be a problem in
contemporary state systems. See Michael Winerip, Michael Schwirtz, & Robert Gebeloff, For Blacks
Facing Parole in New York State, Signs of a Broken System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/04/nyregion/new-york-prisons-inmates-parole-race.html.
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good-time credits.48 Under the version of the federal good-time credit system enacted in
the SRA, every person serving a federal term of imprisonment of more than one year and
less than a life term could receive a fifty-four-day credit at the end of each year spent in
prison.49 The Act vested the BOP with authority to withhold or revoke credits if it
“determine[d]” that a person had “not satisfactorily complied with [ ] institutional
disciplinary regulations.”50 Credits advance prisoners’ release dates, effectively shortening
the duration of their prison terms.51
In addition to good-time credits, the Act created a trio of “sentence modification
provisions” and charged the newly formed U.S. Sentencing Commission with issuing
“general policy statements” regarding “the appropriate use” of these provisions.52 The first
of these three provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3563(c), authorized federal courts to “modify,
reduce, or enlarge the conditions of a sentence of probation at any time prior to the
expiration or termination of the term of probation” after conducting a hearing.53 The second
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3573, permitted a person whose federal sentence included payment
of a fine to petition for modification or remission of the fine upon a showing of changed
circumstances and “a good faith effort to comply with the terms of the sentence.”54
The third provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), permitted federal judges to “reduce [a]
term of imprisonment” if either of two sets of conditions were present. First, if the U.S.
Sentencing Commission lowered the sentencing range applicable to a person’s federal
prison sentence after a court imposed a sentence, then either the imprisoned person or the
Director of the BOP could move for a reduction.55 A court considering such a motion could
grant a sentence reduction “after considering [(1)] the factors set forth in section 3553(a)
to the extent that they are applicable” and (2) whether “a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”56 As discussed in Part
II.A, infra, § 3553(a) instructs federal sentencing courts to construct sentences that are
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with” enumerated sentencing
purposes, such as “the need . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”57
Unlike § 4205(g), which had authorized judges to “reduce any minimum term to the time
the defendant has served,”58 the text of § 3582(c) did not specify that reductions should
result in immediate release.59
48

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 2008–09 (1984).
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2019. The SRA also authorized courts to “terminate” or “extend a term of
supervised release” or “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release” after considering a
subset of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 2000. However, the SRA did not refer to this
provision as a “sentence modification provision[].” See id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2019.
53
Id. § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 1994.
54
Id. at 1997.
55
Id. at 1998–99.
56
Id. at 1999.
57
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
58
18 U.S.C. § 4205(g) (repealed 1987).
59
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 1998–99. See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d
228, 237 (2020) (“It bears remembering that compassionate release is a misnomer. 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A) in fact speaks of sentence reductions. A district court could, for instance, reduce but not
eliminate a defendant’s prison sentence, or end the term of imprisonment but impose a significant term of
probation or supervised release in its place.”).
49
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Second, the Director of the BOP could also move for a reduction under § 3582(c) for
“extraordinary and compelling reasons.”60 A court considering this type of motion would
also need to find that a reduction was “consistent with” the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s
policy statements and any applicable § 3553(a) factors.61 Accordingly, the SRA directed
the Sentencing Commission to “promulgat[e] general policy statements regarding the
sentencing modification provisions” and “describe what should be considered
extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reductions, including the criteria to be
applied and a list of specific examples.”62 Consistent with the SRA’s project of dismantling
federal parole, this part of the SRA specified that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone
shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.”63 In other words, judges
who favored the old indeterminate system could not re-create it through § 3582(c) by
identifying rehabilitation, a goal of the parole system, as sufficient under the new
extraordinary and compelling reasons standard.
Legislative history materials discussing § 3582(c) are sparse. The Senate Judiciary
Committee’s September 1983 report on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1983—an earlier
draft of the SRA—offers a glimpse into how members of Congress might have understood
§ 3582(c). The report described what would become § 3582(c) as creating “safety
valves.”64 The report stated that the “safety valve” for “extraordinary compelling reasons”
would “appl[y], regardless of the length of sentence, to the unusual case in which the
defendant’s circumstances are so changed, such as by terminal illness, that it would be
inequitable to continue the confinement of the prisoner.”65 According to the report, “[t]he
value of the forms of ‘safety valves’. . . lies in the fact that they . . . keep[ ] the sentencing
power in the judiciary where it belongs,”—a reference to the U.S. Parole Commission—
“yet permit[ ] later review of sentences in particularly compelling situations.”66 Although
§ 3582(c) bears some similarities to § 4205(g), which the SRA repealed, legislative history
materials do not appear to draw a connection between these two provisions.
Despite the SRA’s instructions to the Sentencing Commission, early versions of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual did not include policy statements addressing the
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard.67 Instead, the BOP was the first agency
to issue pertinent regulations. In January 1994, the BOP published a final rule concerning
implementation of § 3582(c)(1)(A), the statutory subdivision containing the “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” standard.68 The rule stated that the BOP would move for a
reduction “only when there are particularly extraordinary or compelling circumstances
which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the court at the time of sentencing.”69
The rule instructed people in BOP custody to submit written requests to wardens setting
60

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 1999.
Id.
62
Id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2023.
63
Id.
64
S. REP. NO. 98-223, at 118 (1983).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, also known as the Sentencing Guidelines, provides judges
with tables of recommended penalties to guide judges’ decision-making at sentencings. See infra pp. 30–31
and notes 222–226.
68
Control, Custody, Care, Treatment, and Instruction of Inmates; Compassionate Release, 59 Fed. Reg.
1238, 1238 (Jan. 7, 1994).
69
Id. at 1238–39.
61
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out “[t]he extraordinary or compelling circumstances that the inmate believes warrant
consideration”; “release plans”; and, “if the basis for the request involves the inmate’s
health, information on where the inmate will receive medical treatment, and how the inmate
will pay for such treatment.”70 Written requests for § 3582 motions would then be reviewed
“by the Warden, the Regional Director, the General Counsel, and either the Medical
Director for medical referrals or the Assistant Director, Correctional Programs Division for
non-medical referrals, and with the approval of the Director.”71
Not long thereafter, in July 1994, the Director of the BOP issued a memorandum
outlining the Bureau’s approach to filing motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A).72 The
memorandum noted that the BOP “has historically taken a conservative approach” to filing
motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A) or § 4205(g), which the memorandum treated as
interchangeable forms of “compassionate release requests.”73 The memorandum did not
acknowledge the difference between § 4205(g)’s authorization for reductions “to the time
the defendant has served”74 and § 3582(c)’s broader instruction for judges to “reduce the
term of imprisonment.”75 According to the memorandum, the BOP exercised its authority
to file motions only in “cases [that] . . . f[e]ll within the medical arena.”76
The memorandum also reflected a narrow focus on releasing people who were in the
very final stages of their lives. The memorandum recounted that the BOP’s “general
guideline [had been] to recommend release of an inmate only in cases of terminal illness
when life expectancy was six months or less,” and that the BOP recently had “extended the
time limit to a one-year life expectancy as long as medical staff felt comfortable with the
accuracy of their prediction.”77 The memorandum also listed several factors for BOP staff
to consider when weighing whether to refer requests for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions to the
Director of the BOP. These factors included medical criteria, such as “the nature and
severity of the inmate’s illness”; factors borrowed from the language of § 3553(a);78 and
other considerations, such as “the length of the inmate’s sentence and the amount of time
left to serve.”79
Later that year, in September 1994, Congress amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to include
an additional ground for sentence reductions. Under the revised statute, subsection
(c)(1)(A)(ii) provided that a court could reduce a term of imprisonment for a person who
was “at least 70 years of age, ha[d] served at least 30 years in prison” and was “not a danger
to the safety of any other person or the community.”80 The “extraordinary compelling
reasons” route for sentence reductions was renumbered as § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)—where it
70

Id. at 1239.
Id.
72
EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS DIV., supra note 13, app. 3, at 67–68. Although the SRA repealed §
4205(g), this provision remained in effect for people in BOP custody whose sentencing hearings had
occurred before 1987. See 28 C.F.R. § 572.40 (2022).
73
EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS DIV., supra note 13, at 67.
74
18 U.S.C. § 4205(g) (repealed 1987).
75
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
76
EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS DIV., supra note 13, app. 3, at 67.
77
Id.
78
The considerations borrowed from § 3553(a) included factors such as “the nature and circumstances of
the offense.” Compare id. with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
79
EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS DIV., supra note 13, app. 3, at 68.
80
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–322, § 70002, 108 Stat. 1796,
1984–85 (1994).
71
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remains today. In the case of either type of reduction, only the Director of the BOP could
file a motion, and a judge would still need to find that § 3553(a) factors weighed in favor
of a reduction.81
The U.S. Sentencing Commission did not publish a policy statement addressing §
3582(c)(1)(A) until the 2006 Guidelines Manual. The main text of the policy statement,
numbered § 1B1.13, restated the language of § 3582(c)(1)(A).82 The statement’s
application notes reiterated the statutory command that “rehabilitation of the defendant is
not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason” and announced that “[t]he
Commission intends to develop further criteria to be applied and a list of specific
examples.”83 In the meantime, the application notes to this policy statement authorized the
BOP to move for sentence reductions based on its own interpretation of the “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” standard, stating that “[a] determination made by the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons that a particular case warrants a reduction for extraordinary and
compelling reasons shall be considered as such.”84
The following year, the Sentencing Commission specified four types of
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” in the application notes for Policy Statement §
1B1.13. These were:
(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness.
(ii) The defendant is suffering from a permanent physical or medical
condition, or is experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because
of the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the
defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional
facility and for which conventional treatment promises no substantial
improvement.
(iii) The death or incapacitation of the defendant’s only family member
capable of caring for the defendant’s minor child or minor children.
(iv) As determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in
the defendant’s case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or
in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (i), (ii), and
(iii).85
As detailed in a 2013 report published by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of
the Inspector General (OIG), few people obtained sentence reductions under this version
of § 3582(c)(1)(A), the BOP’s regulations, and policy statement § 1B1.13. The OIG found
that, from 2006 through 2011, an average of twenty-four people obtained release from
prison each year under § 3582(c) and § 4205(g).86 The OIG report took issue with several
81

See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (1994).
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2006).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS DIV., supra note 13, at 1 n.9. Likewise, a report by Human Rights Watch
and Families Against Mandatory Minimums found that “from 1992 through November 2012, the BOP
82
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aspects of the BOP’s process for filing motions under § 3582(c), which the report referred
to as “the BOP’s compassionate release program.”87 The first of the report’s eleven
recommendations was for the BOP to “[c]onsider appropriately expanding the use of the
compassionate release program . . . to cover both medical and non-medical conditions for
inmates who do not present a threat to the community and who present a minimal risk of
recidivism.”88 A more recent study that examined data from 2013 to 2017 found that the
BOP “approved six percent of the 5,400 applications received” during these years, and that
“266 inmates who requested compassionate release died in custody.”89
In 2016, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the application notes to policy
statement § 1B1.13 to include additional guidance regarding the “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” standard. Regarding terminal illness, the revised application notes
explained that “[a] specific prognosis of life expectancy . . . is not required” and listed
“metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ
disease, and advanced dementia” as examples of medical conditions that would constitute
“extraordinary and compelling reasons.”90 The application notes also stated that “a serious
physical or medical condition . . . serious functional or cognitive impairment . . . [or]
deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process” would meet the §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i) standard if a person’s “ability . . . to provide self-care” was “substantially
diminishe[d]” and the person was “not expected to recover.”91 In addition, the application
notes listed “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner when the
defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spousal registered partner” as an
example of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”92 Other changes to the application
notes included a statement that “an extraordinary and compelling reason need not have
been unforeseen at the time of sentencing.”93
The revised application notes also reiterated that “[a] reduction under this policy
statement may be granted only upon motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).”94 As in the previous versions, the application notes
authorized the BOP to “determine[] . . . [if] there exists in the defendant’s case an
extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons” listed
in the application notes.95 The combination of these two application notes would soon play
an important role in cases interpreting amendments to § 3582(c).

made only 492 motions for compassionate release, an annual average of about two dozen.” The Answer Is
No: Too Little Compassionate Release in U.S. Federal Prisons, HUM RTS. WATCH & FAMS. AGAINST
MANDATORY MINIMUMS 34 (Nov. 2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1112For
UploadSm.pdf. Although the Sentencing Reform Act of 1987 repealed § 4205(g), this provision remains in
effect for people in BOP custody whose sentencing hearings occurred before 1987. See 28 C.F.R. § 572.40
(2022).
87
EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS DIV., supra note 13, at 1 n.6.
88
Id. at 55.
89
Christie Thompson, Old, Sick and Dying in Shackles, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 7, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/03/07/old-sick-and-dying-in-shackles.
90
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(i) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2016).
91
Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(ii).
92
Id. §§ 1B1.13 cmt. n. 1(C), 1(D).
93
Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.2.
94
Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.4.
95
Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D).
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B. The First Step Act of 2018 and the COVID-19 Pandemic
This was the state of the federal sentence reduction statute when the First Step Act
of 2018 (FSA) shifted § 3582(c)(1)(A) from funneling requests for reductions through the
Director of the BOP to authorizing the over 600 federal district judges across the country
to grant reductions without BOP approval.96 This change also freed district judges in much
of the country to determine for themselves what reasons justified reductions, instead of
following the BOP’s narrow interpretation of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”
When the arrival of COVID-19 upended life inside U.S. prisons in early 2019, thousands
of people in federal custody began filing motions for sentence reductions. Several hundreds
of these motions included arguments grounded in the pandemic’s dual impact—not only
the risks of serious illness and death, but also the lockdowns, suspensions of visits, and
other restrictions that officials imposed to curb the spread of infections.
In a section titled “Increasing the Use and Transparency of Compassionate Release,”
the FSA amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to state that federal courts could reduce federal prison
sentences upon a motion by either (1) the Director of the BOP or (2) an imprisoned person,
after meeting a modest administrative exhaustion requirement.97 The FSA also defined
“terminal illness” as “a disease or condition with an end-of-life trajectory” and required
the BOP to notify imprisoned people about § 3582(c)(1)(A), process requests for motions
promptly, and report data related to requests, motions, and releases from prison.98 Aside
from a few passing comments that the FSA would “expand” or “enhance[ ] . . .
compassionate release,”99 the legislative record does not indicate that these changes to §
3582(c)(1)(A) received much attention in Congress prior to the FSA’s passage.
Beyond increasing the number of decision-makers who could act on requests for
sentence reductions, the FSA also diluted the authority of the BOP and the Sentencing
Commission to interpret the scope of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)’s “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” standard.100 The FSA left unchanged language in § 3582(c)(1)(A) requiring
judges to find that “any reduction” under either subdivision (i) or (ii) “is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”101 Policy Statement
§ 1B1.13’s application notes, in turn, continued to authorize reductions under §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i) for “Other Reasons” beyond the specific examples listed in the application
notes and specified that these reasons would be “determined by the Director of the Bureau

96

The amended text still required people in BOP custody to exhaust administrative remedies by first
requesting that the Director of the BOP file a motion. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, § 603(b),
132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018).
97
The relevant text states that a motion may be filed directly by “the defendant after the defendant has fully
exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the
defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such request by the warden of the defendant’s
facility, whichever is earlier.” Id. Under the BOP’s current regulations, the BOP will only file a motion
after review and approval by “[a] Warden, the General Counsel [of the BOP] . . . either the Medical
Director for medical referrals or the Assistant Director, Correctional Programs Division for non-medical
referrals, and . . . the Director [of the BOP].” Approval of Request, 28 C.F.R. § 571.62(a) (2022).
98
First Step Act of 2018 § 603(b), 132 Stat. at 5239–41.
99
See 164 CONG. REC. H4311 (May 22, 2018) (statement of Rep. Jerry Nadler); 164 CONG. REC. S7774
(Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Cardin).
100
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
101
See id. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
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of Prisons.”102 The application notes, however, were not updated to address motions filed
directly by imprisoned people. Rather, the application notes still stated that, “[a] reduction
under this policy statement may be granted only upon motion by the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons.”103 Between September 2020 and early 2022, eleven federal circuit courts held
that the application notes to policy statement § 1B1.13 therefore applied only to §
3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by the Director of the BOP and not to motions filed directly
by people serving federal prison sentences.104 In other words, when imprisoned people filed
motions directly, the BOP was not in charge of deciding what sorts of “Other Reasons”
could justify release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Instead, federal district judges reviewing
motions for sentence reductions in much of the country were “freed . . . to consider the full
slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons that an imprisoned person might bring before
them.”105
Barely a year after the FSA amended § 3582(c) in December 2018, the arrival of
the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States in early 2020 rapidly changed conditions of
confinement in prisons across the country. The spread of COVID-19, along with officials’
efforts to curb the spread of infections, changed what imprisonment entailed in two
respects. First, the congregate settings within prisons made social distancing difficult or
impossible, exposing imprisoned people to high risks of infection, serious illness, and
death.106 By July 2022, the BOP reported that over 55,000 people held in federal prisons
and jails had tested positive for COVID-19, and over 300 had died from illnesses caused
by COVID-19.107 The full toll of the COVID-19 pandemic on incarcerated people across
the United States is much larger; one estimate puts the total number of infections and deaths
in state and federal prisons, jails, and detention facilities at over 600,000 and 3,000,
respectively.108 Second, “lockdowns” and other restrictions on movement within prisons
meant that people were locked in their cells or housing units for most or all of each day,
and that access to everything from showers and medical attention to educational
programming and family visits was suspended or curtailed.109
Beginning in March 2020, the BOP implemented restrictions on movement,
programming, and services within its facilities in order to curb the spread of COVID-19.
The BOP’s first press release on these measures announced that “[o]n March 13, 2020, the
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2016).
Id. (emphasis added).
104
United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2022); United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255,
259–60 (3rd Cir. 2021); United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2021); United States v.
Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 836–37 (10th Cir. 2021); United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir.
2021); United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d
271, 281 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v.
Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1109–11 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 235–37 (2d Cir.
2020). But see United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1263–65 (11th Cir. 2021).
105
Brooker, 976 F.3d at 237.
106
See Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Viral Injustice, 110 CAL. L. REV. 117, 123–31 (2022).
107
COVID-19 Coronavirus, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited July
19, 2022).
108
COVID Behind Bars Data Project, U.C.L.A. L., https://uclacovidbehindbars.org/ (last visited July 19,
2022).
109
See, e.g., Bureau of Prisons Update on COVID-19, supra note 1; Foster v. Comm’r of Corr., 146 N.E.3d
372, 382 (Mass. 2020); Keri Blakinger, What Happens When More Than 300,000 Prisoners Are Locked
Down?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/15/whathappens-when-more-than-300-000-prisoners-are-locked-down.
102
103

17

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2022

Bureau instituted significant measures,” including “temporary restrictions on visitation,
restricting inmate movement to only required and mission-essential transfers,” and “a
mandatory 14-day quarantine for all new inmates.”110 Nearly a year later, in January 2021,
the BOP issued a press release acknowledging that, “[f]or the majority of the past twelve
months, the BOP has been operating under a modified operational model,” and that “this
pandemic has placed a heavy burden on inmates and their families in terms of limited
movement and the public’s restrictions and being able to freely visit with loved ones.”111
At the end of 2021, the BOP’s website stated that it was continuing to follow “modified
operations,” including permitting people to move within prisons only “in small numbers”
and for the following purposes: “A. Commissary B. Laundry C. Showers three times each
week D. Telephone” and “when necessary, for the provision of required mental health or
medical care.”112 These policies have meant that, during much of the pandemic, people in
BOP custody have lived under burdensome restrictions, including being confined in their
cells or housing units for most hours of the day.113
Arguments grounded in the pandemic’s dual impact on prison conditions soon
made their way into motions for sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Imprisoned
people linked these changes to both the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard
and the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Arguments relating to the “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” standard framed the pandemic as a drastic reordering of prison life
that justified eligibility for sentence reductions. Arguments relating to the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors urged judges to weigh the hardships caused by pandemic-era prison
conditions as part of the rebalancing of sentencing purposes required by § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Precisely how many § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions and decisions discussed changes in
prison conditions in this manner is unclear. Most motions citing the pandemic as a reason
for accelerated release focused on the narrow, technical issue of whether individuals met
the criteria for increased risk of severe illness published by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC).114 A report published by the U.S. Sentencing Commission in
September 2021 detailed that, from January 2020 through June 2021, federal judges
granted 3,608 requests for sentence reductions and denied 16,957 requests.115 The statistics
110

Bureau of Prisons Update on COVID-19, supra note 1.
Temporary Security Measures Implemented, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (Jan. 16, 2021, 5:00 AM),
https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/20210116_precaution.jsp.
112
BOP Modified Operations, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (Nov. 25, 2020),
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/covid19_status.jsp.
113
See, e.g., United States v. Regas, 3:91-cr-00057-MMD-NA-1-57, 2020 WL 2926457, at *3 (D. Nev.
June 3, 2020) (“Defendant is isolated in his cell for 22.5 hours a day, despite his elderly age and good
behavior.”). People confined in state prisons and jails, as well as people held in immigration detention
facilities, faced similar hardships. This Article focuses on people in BOP custody, because the FSA’s
amendments to the federal sentence reduction statute only affected people serving federal sentences.
114
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 509 F. Supp. 3d 616, 622–23 (S.D. W. Va. 2020) (granting motion
because “[b]oth obesity and severe obesity are on the CDC’s list of conditions that put someone at
increased risk for severe illness from COVID-19) (citing Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): People
with Certain Medical Conditions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 2, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html).
In addition—and, understandably, given pressures of time, limited information, and rapid infections and
hospitalizations—some judges ruled on § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions through unpublished orders or on the
record during hearings. As a result, some decisions might not be available via online legal databases.
115
U.S. Sentencing Commission Compassionate Release Data Report: Calendar Years 2020 to 2021, U.S.
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in this report included demographic information, sentence length, offense of conviction,
and “Selected Sentencing Factors for Offenders Receiving Compassionate Release,” but
they did not track whether or how judges discussed changes in prison conditions.116
In March 2022, the Sentencing Commission published a report focused on the impact
of the pandemic on § 3582(c) rulings during federal fiscal year 2020.117 According to this
report, federal judges granted sentence reductions to 1,805 out of 7,014 people (25.7%)
during the fiscal year 2020—up from 145 people in the first year after the enactment of the
First Step Act.118 The report also found that, among decisions that granted relief, 59.6%
cited “the risk of contracting or experiencing serious illness from COVID-19” as the sole
basis for relief, and 11.9% cited “COVID-19 and Other Reasons.”119 The report did not
state whether these reasons included changed prison conditions apart from increased risks
of infections. The report concluded that “[a]n offender’s age, the length of original sentence
imposed, and the amount of time the offender had already served emerged as the central
factors that impacted the likelihood an offender would be granted relief.”120 Additionally,
the report documented that, among decisions that denied relief, 47.9% “cited either the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors or danger to the public (or both) as at least one reason for
denial.”121
This Article estimates that a relatively small number of § 3582(c)(1)(A) rulings—at
least a few hundred—addressed arguments that changed prison conditions beyond
increased risks of illness and death constituted grounds for reductions.122 A smaller subset
of decisions—at least eighty-five—granted motions for reasons that included some form
of this argument, and at least a dozen more decisions endorsed this proposition while
concluding that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against reductions. Roughly half of the
decisions granting reductions came from the Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York.123 The below overview does not seek to illustrate which types of rulings were more
SENT’G COMM’N tbl. 5. (Sept. 2021), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/federal-sentencing-statistics/compassionate-release/20210928-Compassionate-Release.pdf
[hereinafter Compassionate Release Data Report].
116
Id.
117
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, COMPASSIONATE RELEASE: THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST STEP ACT AND COVID-19
PANDEMIC (Mar. 2022), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2022/20220310_compassionate-release.pdf.
118
Id. at 3.
119
Id. at 32, 49.
120
Id. at 4.
121
Id. at 45.
122
The following search string, when applied to all federal decisions available in WestLaw’s online
database as of July 2022, yielded 686 results: “3582(c)(1)(A) AND (pandemic or COVID-19) /p (harsh!
OR intended OR punitive).” A slightly shorter search string, when applied to all federal decisions available
in WestLaw’s online database, yielded 486 results: “3582(c)(1)(A) AND (pandemic or COVID-19) /p
(harsh! OR punitive).” Some of the results of these search strings were not relevant to this Article’s
discussion (e.g., cases discussing what Congress “intended” regarding the FSA’s exhaustion requirement or
characterizing the initial duration of a sentence as “harsh”). A broader search string yielded 1,615 results:
“3582(c)(1)(A) AND (pandemic or COVID-19) /p (harsh! OR punitive OR severity).” However, this third
search string yielded many cases that discussed the “severity” of medical conditions in relation to the
narrow, technical issue of whether a medical condition met the CDC’s criteria for increased risk for severe
illness.
123
There are a number of potential reasons for this apparent clustering of rulings in these districts,
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widespread but rather attempts to summarize the full array of approaches that were used
by judges confronting the pandemic’s dual impact.124
A brief note is also in order regarding judges’ use of the terms “punitive effect” or
“severity” to refer to the total amount or degree of punishment that a sentence carries out.
As discussed in Part II.A, infra, the main federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
imposes a parsimony requirement; it commands judges to craft sentences that are
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with” a set of enumerated sentencing
purposes.125 The sets of penalties available to judges dictate how judges comply with this
requirement, and the contemporary federal sentencing scheme formally designates
imprisonment as a single type of penalty. Thus, judges do not select between more or less
restrictive forms of imprisonment at sentencing proceedings. Rather, their sentencing
decisions regarding prison are limited to (i) whether to include a term of imprisonment,
and, if so, (ii) the duration of a term of imprisonment.126
Federal statutes are silent as to whether judges can ever consider more than the
duration of a term of imprisonment when assessing how much punishment a term of
imprisonment carries out. Some of the rulings discussed below used terms such as
“punitive effect” and “severity” to describe the idea that both the conditions and duration
of confinement play roles in determining how much punishment a term of imprisonment
represents. For the most part, these rulings did not cite pre-pandemic judicial precedents or
academic literature when discussing these ideas. However, these ideas have surfaced
sporadically in the past in both settings. For example, Justice Blackmun once reasoned that
“a period of confinement” in “a prison characterized by rampant violence and terror” would
be “a more extreme punishment” than the same amount of time in “a relatively safe, wellmanaged prison.”127 In addition, when the Sentencing Guidelines were still mandatory, the
including proximity to people experiencing serious illness caused by COVID-19, proximity to front-line
medical professionals (e.g., judges with emergency medicine health professionals or epidemiologists in
their families or social circles), and the degree to which judges in a particular district may be more or less
likely to find their peers’ decisions persuasive (i.e., in some districts, an early decision by one judge
granting release may have had a greater impact on that judges’ peers than it would have in other districts).
Identifying the full range of these potential reasons and investigating which reasons were more likely to
have caused this apparent clustering of rulings is beyond the scope of this Article.
124
In the year between the enactment of the First Step Act and the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in
the United States, at least two judges employed similar reasoning in § 3582(c) rulings that considered the
implications of serious illness for § 3553(a)’s sentencing purposes and parsimony requirement. See United
States v. Beck, 425 F. Supp. 3d 573, 586 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (“She has served nearly two years of her
[prison] term with invasive breast cancer, and the BOP has repeatedly mismanaged her care, including
delaying medical appointments for so long that neither chemo nor radiation therapy would be effective . . . .
‘This means that [her] sentence has been significantly more laborious than that served by most inmates . . .
[and] further incarceration in [her] condition would [therefore] be greater than necessary to serve the
purposes of punishment set forth in § 3553(a).’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Gray, 416 F. Supp. 3d
784, 790 (S.D. Ind. 2019) (“Mr. Gray has served much of his sentence while seriously ill. This means that
his sentence has been significantly more laborious and difficult than that served by most inmates . . . [and]
further incarceration in his condition would [therefore] be greater than necessary to serve the purposes of
punishment set forth in § 3553(a).”).
125
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
126
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3553. An exception to this framework is that federal judges can make nonbinding recommendations to the BOP at initial sentencings for assignments to specific prisons. These
recommendations often concern placing people in facilities that are closer to family members or that feature
specific rehabilitative programs.
127
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 855 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court held that federal judges could impose shorter, below-Guidelines sentences
upon finding that people were “particularly likely to be targets of abuse during their
incarceration.”128 In the academic context, Judge Richard Posner theorized that “the
severity of punishment can be varied other than by varying the length of imprisonment” by
taking into account aspects of life in prison, such as the “[s]ize of prison cell, temperature
[of a cell,] and quality of food.”129 Further, Professors Sharon Dolovich and Alex Reinert
have argued that prison conditions should be considered punishment for the purposes of
Eighth Amendment claims.130 Part II.A, infra, examines these concepts in more detail.
Moreover, although federal courts primarily use the term “punitive effect” in cases
examining whether a purportedly civil regulation constitutes punishment and therefore
triggers constitutional protections (i.e., judges assess whether a statute has “a punitive
effect”),131 a small number of federal judges have used “punitive effect” to describe the
amount of punishment a sentence carries out. For example, a judge on the Second Circuit
has used the term in the course of explaining a rule requiring that sentencing courts know
the duration of all relevant sentences before imposing a consecutive sentence, “so that the
punitive effect of the consecutive sentences is carefully considered.”132 The same Second
Circuit judge has also used “punitive effect” to explain the principle that a sentencing court
may increase the amount of a fine on remand from an appellate decision vacating a term of
imprisonment. In the judge’s words, “[i]n selecting $25,000 as the appropriate fine [at
initial sentencing], we think it reasonable to assume that [the sentencing judge] had in mind
the aggregate punitive effect of [the] sentence,” but “[n]ow that the twenty-one-month term
of imprisonment is being set aside, the sentencing judge should have the option of
considering whether to make an upward adjustment in the amount of the fine.” 133 Chief
Justice Burger also once used “punitive effect” to describe the idea that the marginal
amount of punishment associated with a year in prison decreases as prison terms increase
in duration. Specifically, Chief Justice Burger argued in a dissenting opinion that the Eighth
Amendment permits states to execute people who commit serious offenses while already
128

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 112 (1996).
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1212 (1985).
130
See infra pp. 37–38 and notes 263–272.
131
See, e.g., Doe v. Settle, 24 F.4th 932, 947 (4th Cir. 2022) (“To assess punitive effect, we look to the list
of seven factors first compiled in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US. [144] 168–69 [(1963)] . . . .
These factors have been used in a handful of constitutional contexts—Ex Post Facto Clause, Sixth
Amendment, and Eighth Amendment—and they create a framework for [determining whether a civil
regulation is] . . . a ‘punishment.’”).
132
Salley v. United States, 786 F.2d 546, 548 (2d. Cir. 1986) (Newman, J., concurring). At least one district
judge within the Second Circuit has used the term punitive effect in the same manner when citing this
opinion for this proposition. Germaine v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 41, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[I]t is
incumbent upon a sentencing judge to consider the length of other sentences, as well as the punitive effect
on the defendant, before imposing a consecutive sentence.” (citing Salley, 786 F.3d at 548 (Newman, J.,
concurring)). In addition, at least one other district judge has used the term “punitive effect” to explain a
decision to include a conviction for a lesser-included offense within a criminal judgment, without a
corresponding sentence, in order to anticipate the potential for vacatur on appeal. United States v. Fuentes,
729 F. Supp. 487, 493 (E.D. Va. 1989) (“[L]eaving the [lesser-included offense] conviction intact . . .
minimizes the risk that the defendant’s criminal conduct will go unpunished . . . . Any inherent punitive
effect flowing from the continuing existence of the merged lesser-included offense conviction, even
without a sentence, is outweighed by the interest in ensuring that those convicted of serious crimes do not
unjustifiably escape punishment.”).
133
United States v. Versaglio, 85 F.3d 943, 949 (2d Cir. 1996).
129
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serving lengthy sentences, because “the imposition of additional periods of imprisonment
would have no incremental punitive effect.”134
1. Rulings rejecting arguments that prison conditions should be included among the
reasons for sentence reductions
Many judges rejected the notion that changes in prison conditions were cognizable
as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Some of these judges
concluded that sentence reductions were not the proper legal mechanism for addressing
conditions of confinement, while others reasoned that changes could not be “extraordinary”
if they affected most or all people in federal prisons. H.S,135 who was serving a twentyyear sentence in a private prison in Texas that had contracted with the BOP, moved for a
sentence reduction in March 2020.136 H.S. argued that his status as a seventy-three-yearold with diabetes placed him at heightened risk for serious illness or death if he contracted
COVID-19, and that “various conditions of his confinement, including lack of visitation,
threats, and the unavailability of a proper diabetic diet” supplied additional “reasons
warranting a sentence reduction.”137 The court denied H.S.’s motion and stated in its
decision that § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) was not “the proper avenue to challenge those alleged
conditions.”138
J.C., who was serving a 170-month sentence at Beaumont Federal Correctional
Institution (FCI) in Texas, moved twice for a sentence reduction on the grounds that he
was experiencing persistent symptoms after contracting COVID-19, had received
inadequate medical care, and “had been placed in prolonged isolation due to his diagnosis,
which affect[ed] his mental health.”139 The court denied J.C.’s motion and commented that,
“[i]nsofar as [J.C.] seeks judicial review of his conditions of confinement . . . he may file
a civil rights complaint.”140
L.T., who was serving a seven-year sentence at FCI Sheridan in Oregon, moved for
release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in November 2020 and again in July 2021.141 L.T.’s
motion cited his Hepatitis C diagnosis and the fact that the BOP’s “attempt to control the
virus in the crowded world of prisons has led to isolation, denial of recreation and
programming, and denial of visits and even phone calls.”142 The court acknowledged that
“nearly every incarcerated person . . . has experienced limitations on their ability to
communicate, exercise, gain an education, and receive job skills training during the
COVID-19 pandemic.”143 However, the court concluded that “[c]onditions that are shared
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Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 606 (1977) (Burger, J., dissenting).
The names of the people whose cases this Article discusses are matters of public record. Nevertheless,
the main text of this Article identifies individuals by their initials out of recognition that the public nature
of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions compelled people to reveal highly personal information about the hardships
they faced while incarcerated during the pandemic.
136
United States v. Stevens, 459 F. Supp. 3d 478, 479–80 (W.D.N.Y. 2020).
137
Id. at 487.
138
Id.
139
United States v. Carrera, No. 3:14-CR-367 (JJB), 2020 WL 7225997, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2020).
140
Id. at *4 (citing Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020)).
141
United States v. Thomas, No. 3:17-CR-51 (SLG), 2021 WL 3924724, at *1 (D. Alaska Sept. 1, 2021).
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Id. at *2.
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by nearly every inmate in the country are not ‘extraordinary and compelling.’”144
M.F., who was serving a ten-year sentence at FCI Milan in Michigan, argued in his
second motion for a sentence reduction that his body mass index (BMI) of 31 and asthma
diagnosis heightened his risk of severe illness or death, and that he had “experienced
varying forms of quarantine,” including both “dorm-style quarantines” and “solitary
confinement.”145 The court denied M.F.’s motion and stated that M.F.’s argument “that the
pandemic has created a harsher punishment than was intended at sentencing” was “entirely
unpersuasive.”146 The court remarked that “[n]early all Americans experienced some sort
of lockdown during the pandemic,” and reasoned that, because “[l]ockdown and related
efforts, such as social distancing were necessary steps to minimize the spread of the virus,”
M.F.’s arguments relating to changed prison conditions “undercut his position that he fears
contracting the virus while incarcerated.”147
2. Rulings treating changed prison conditions as cognizable
but insufficient to justify relief
Some judges indicated that they would be open to treating changes in prison
conditions as cognizable under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) but determined that the facts raised in
the particular cases before them were insufficient to meet the “extraordinary compelling
reasons” standard or outweigh competing § 3553(a) factors. J.A., who was serving a
roughly ten-year sentence at FCI Otisville in New York, argued that his obesity and
diabetes diagnoses justified his release.148 In addition, J.A. “request[ed] in the alternative
that his sentence be reduced to a time short of time served” because “the conditions of his
incarceration have been more harsh – with more confinement and isolation and less
programming – as a result of the pandemic.”149 Regarding J.A.’s argument about the impact
of the pandemic on prison conditions, the court stated that it did “not disagree with that
assertion as far as it goes.”150 However, turning to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the
court reasoned that “the threat [J.A] poses to public safety by returning to his old ways”
weighed “decidedly against a reduction.”151 The court also commented that, “[t]o reduce
J.A.’s sentence, which was at the bottom of the sentencing guidelines range, would not be
just punishment and would introduce unwarranted sentencing disparities.”152 For these
reasons, the court concluded that “[r]educing [J.A.]’s sentence because he suffered
somewhat harsher conditions than anticipated for what will likely be a year of his term is
not consistent with the Court’s obligation, under Section 3553(a), to protect the public and
deter the defendant.”153
A.F., who was serving a thirty-year sentence at FCI Gilmer in West Virginia, moved
for a sentence reduction on grounds that included a spike in COVID-19 infections and
144

Id.
United States v. Farnsworth, No. 15-CR-20095 (MAG), 2021 WL 4962135, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
26, 2021).
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Id. at *5.
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Id.
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United States v. Agosto, No. 3:17-CR-98, 2021 WL 82088, at *4–5 (D. Conn. Jan. 11, 2021).
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restrictions on movement.154 The court observed that “[t]he proliferation of COVID-19
cases at FCI Gilm[er] has resulted in conditions more punitive than one otherwise would
have expected.”155 According to the court, this fact, in combination with changes in A.F.’s
family circumstances and personal rehabilitation, met the “extraordinary compelling
reasons” standard.156 However, because A.F. “was personally involved in two murders,
including the fatal shooting of a person [A.F.] knew to be a confidential informant,” the
court concluded that “the 3553(a) factors weigh[ed] against his release or reduction in his
sentence.”157
3. Rulings requiring a close fit between prison conditions and specific medical
conditions or ailments
Some judges treated changes in prison conditions as relevant to the extent that they
exacerbated specific medical risks or ailments. M.C., who was serving a roughly six-year
sentence at FCI Petersburg in Virginia, contended that pandemic-related restrictions had
interfered with his treatment for ulcerative colitis.158 The court agreed that M.C. “had a
uniquely difficult time during his incarceration because of his ulcerative colitis, the delay
in diagnosis, and the COVID-19 pandemic.”159 In the court’s view, this meant that “[t]he
deterrent and punitive effect of serving a sentence under these conditions is significantly
increased.”160 According to the court, M.C.’s records revealed that “he experienced
significant problems from his ulcerative colitis for months before the BOP referred him to
a GI specialist.”161 Specifically, “[e]ven after this referral, nothing happened for three
months, and he only obtained the test necessary to accurately diagnose his condition after
being hospitalized for acute medical emergency.”162 As a result, “[h]e lost 15 pounds within
a few weeks and he was so dehydrated that doctors contemplated a blood transfusion.”163
The court stated that M.C.’s “case presents difficult questions,” because “if every defendant
who experiences this hardship during their incarceration is entitled to a finding of
extraordinary and compelling circumstances, compassionate release would become the
exception that swallows the general rule of finality.”164 Ultimately, the court found that
M.C. met the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard because his “motion [was]
based on the combination and confluence of circumstances surrounding his medical crisis
during the pandemic, not on the pandemic alone.”165
Turning to the § 3553(a) factors, the court again treated the severity of M.C.’s
experience of imprisonment as relevant. The court viewed the “nature and circumstances”
of M.C.’s robbery conviction to be “appalling.”166 However, the court concluded that a
154
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sentence reduction was appropriate because “the length and severity of [M.C.’s]
symptoms” meant that “[h]is incarceration has been significantly more punitive than that
experienced by most inmates.”167
S.H., who was serving a four-and-a-half-year sentence in multiple federal facilities,
argued that the combination of several medical conditions and changed prison conditions
justified a sentence reduction.168 Notably, S.H. was vaccinated for COVID-19 by the time
the court took up her motion in April 2021.169 Acknowledging that “the risk to her health
posed by COVID-19 may have diminished,” S.H. nevertheless argued that “the conditions
of her imprisonment over the last thirteen months constitute[d] ‘extraordinary compelling
reasons.’”170 The court agreed and explained that, “due to the extreme lockdown conditions
at the MCC and the MDC, [S.H.] has been unable to receive mental health care, drug abuse
treatment, and other important services that the Court envisioned her receiving while
incarcerated.”171 The court reasoned that “harsh conditions of confinement alone are
insufficient” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) but concluded that, “given [S.H.]’s serious mental
and physical health issues, deprivation of these services for such a prolonged period of time
rises to the level of ‘extraordinary compelling reasons’ for compassionate release.”172 The
court also treated these facts as relevant under § 3553(a), stating that “[S.H.]’s offense was
serious and deserving of the 52-month term of the prison that she received[, b]ut . . . the
Court did not envision [S.H.] to serve this term of imprisonment in near-total lockdown.”173
M.Q., who was roughly twenty-one years into a mandatory life sentence, moved for
a sentence reduction for reasons that included his hypertension and pre-diabetes
diagnoses.174 As the court observed, “[h]e had been managing these conditions through diet
and exercise but prolonged lockdown at Otisville . . . prevented him from following his
regimen, leading to increased blood pressure.”175 Around the same time, M.Q. experienced
“chest pain” and “heart irregularities,” and testing revealed the possibility of damaged
tissue in his heart.176 In concluding that M.Q. demonstrated “extraordinary compelling
reasons,” the court found that “Otisville’s lockdown—which has lasted in one form or
another for 16 months—has prevented [M.Q.] from adequately managing his hypertension
and pre-diabetes,” leading in turn “to high blood pressure readings and complaints of chest
pain and heart irregularities.”177 The court reduced M.Q.’s term of imprisonment to time
served (approximately twenty-one years), but did not discuss these considerations in
connection with the § 3553(a) factors, focusing instead on M.Q.’s record of rehabilitation
167
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in prison.178
4. Rulings treating changed prison conditions as cognizable without requiring
connections to specific conditions or ailments
Some judges did not require a close fit between changed prison conditions and
specific medical diagnoses. The first decision of this type appears to be the case of L.M.,
who was less than one month from completing a one-year sentence at FCI Danbury in
Connecticut when she obtained release.179 In reviewing the § 3553(a) factors, the court
reasoned that, “[a]lthough the original sentence appropriately balanced the purposes of
sentencing,” a reduction would “not diminish the seriousness of the offense or respect for
the law.”180 As the court explained, “[t]he fact that [L.M.] has been incarcerated at FCIDanbury during a serious outbreak of COVID-19 inside the facility sufficiently increased
the severity of the sentence beyond what was originally anticipated.”181
Later decisions expanded on this approach and discussed changed prison conditions
in more detail. Many of these decisions treated prison conditions as one factor to be
considered in combination with medical conditions that, on their own, would not justify
release (often because they did not meet the CDC’s criteria for increased risk of serious
illness). D.R., who was roughly twenty years into a life sentence at FCI Allenwood in
Pennsylvania, obtained a reduction to thirty years in September 2020.182 The court found
that D.R. “suffers from a number of documented health conditions” that “put him at a high
risk of severe illness from COVID-19” and therefore “constitute extraordinary and
compelling reasons.”183 The court acknowledged that “[i]t might seem” that D.R.’s
vulnerability to serious illness would “support a claim for immediate release,” but
“diminish in importance once the pandemic was over.”184 However, the court reasoned that
“this is not entirely so,” because “the pandemic, aside from posing a threat to [D.R.]’s
health, has made [D.R.]’s incarceration harsher and more punitive than would otherwise
have been the case.”185 As the court explained, “federal prisons, as ‘prime candidates’ for
the spread of the virus . . . have had to impose onerous lockdowns and restrictions that have
made the incarceration of prisoners far harsher than normal.”186
The court concluded that D.R.’s “risk of suffering severe health consequences . . .
coupled [with] the severe conditions imposed by the concomitant lockdowns and
restrictions,” caused “the actual severity of [D.R.’s] sentence . . . [to] exceed[ ] what the
Court anticipated at the time of sentencing.”187 According to the court, “[w]hile insufficient
on its own,” the impact of these restrictions “weighs in favor of a finding of extraordinary
and compelling reasons.”188
The court returned to this point when it analyzed the § 3553(a) factors. Although the
178
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court rejected D.R.’s request for immediate release, the court concluded that a reduction to
thirty years was warranted because “the pandemic has rendered [D.R.]’s sentence far
harsher and more punitive than the Court had anticipated at sentencing.”189
Roughly a year later, a court reduced the sentences of three people imprisoned at FCI
Fort Dix in New Jersey based on findings that, “during the COVID-19 pandemic, the
conditions of confinement at FCI Fort Dix have been extremely difficult.”190 As the court
explained, all three people contracted COVID-19, but “[e]ven before their positive
diagnoses, the situation at Fort Dix in the fall caused emotional suffering and distress,” and
“the situation ha[d] been compounded by isolation from the outside world.”191 According
to the court, “[a]ccess to telephone calls” at Fort Dix was “so limited as to be almost nonexistent during the pandemic.”192 The court’s discussions of both the extraordinary and
compelling reasons standard and the § 3553(a) factors invoked the idea that “conditions of
confinement during this time were substantially more punitive than was contemplated at
the time of sentencing.”193
Ultimately, the court reduced the three men’s sentences from 181 to 172 months, 240
to 231 months, and 210 to 204 months.194 The court explained that the person who received
a six-month reduction had “a significant criminal history for violence.”195 Additionally, the
court noted that “[h]is bout with the virus was not severe, and there is nothing to indicate
that he had other medical needs that were ignored during the pandemic.”196
Around the same time, J.R., who was serving a thirty-five-year sentence at FCI Fort
Dix, obtained a sentence reduction after the court found that “the pandemic ha[d] spawned
conditions of confinement far more punishing than what could have been expected at the
time of [J.R.]’s sentencing.”197 As the court observed, the BOP’s response to COVID-19
“limited inmates’ access to visitors such as family, to counsel, and to rehabilitative,
therapeutic, and recreational programs,” and included “onerous lockdowns.”198 In the
court’s view, “[a] day spent in prison under extreme lockdown and a legitimate fear of
contracting a once-in-a-century deadly virus exacts a price on a prisoner beyond that
imposed by an ordinary day in prison.”199 The court reasoned that, “[w]hile such conditions
are not intended as punishment, incarceration in such circumstances is, unavoidably,
experienced as more punishing.”200 The court found that J.R. had met the “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” standard and directed counsel for J.R. and the government to
submit briefs on the size of the reduction.
189
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One judge went so far as to indicate that burdensome restrictions within prison were
more salient than other considerations.201 J.J.R., who was twenty-seven years into a life
sentence at FCI Herlong in California, moved for a sentence reduction on June 3, 2020, for
reasons that included his age (seventy-seven years), his vulnerability to infection, and a
prison lockdown that had been in effect since March 24, 2020.202 After discussing J.J.R.’s
risk of infection, the court wrote: “More importantly, the Court finds that placing
Defendant in solitary confinement for the indefinite future to protect him from contracting
COVID-19 is a severe and extreme measure under these circumstances.”203 As the court
recounted, J.J.R. was “isolated in his cell for 22.5 hours a day, despite his elderly age and
good behavior.”204 The court reduced J.J.R’s life sentence to time served, resulting in his
release from prison, and imposed a three-year term of supervised release.205
In addition to these decisions by federal district judges, a judge on the Fourth
Circuit discussed changed prison conditions in a concurrence for a case addressing the
standard of review for § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) rulings. This judge remarked that “[t]here is good
reason to believe that, in some cases, a sentence that was ‘sufficient but not greater than
necessary’ before the coronavirus pandemic may no longer meet that criteria.”206 Echoing
the decisions discussed above, the judge wrote that “[a] day in prison under the current
conditions is a qualitatively different type of punishment than one day in prison used to
be.”207 As he explained, “[s]ome facilities house inmates who now serve their sentences
knowing that they are not equipped to guard against the virus that may result in serious
illness or death,” and “[o]ther facilities keep COVID-19 at bay by placing inmates in
solitary confinement, ending prison programs, restricting visitation, and limiting access to
nonessential medical care.”208 According to this judge, “[t]hese conditions, not
contemplated by the original sentencing court, undoubtedly increase a prison sentence’s
punitive effect.”209
II. IMPLICATIONS & LESSONS
The convergence of COVID-19’s arrival in the United States and the FSA’s revisions
to the federal sentence reduction statute prompted judges to consider whether prison
conditions can change how much punishment a sentence carries out. Title 18, Section
3553(a) commands judges to impose sentences that are “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary,” to comply with enumerated sentencing purposes.210 As summarized above,
after hearing of the changes that occurred inside prisons during the pandemic, some judges
concluded that the balances they struck under § 3553(a) at initial sentencings had been
upended. The § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) rulings discussing prison conditions thus provide an entry
201
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point for examining the relationship between prison conditions and punitive effect. These
decisions also supply a rationale for viewing transparency concerning prison conditions as
relating to the fairness of sentences.
A. Whether to Understand Prison Conditions as a Determinant of Punitive Effect Is a
System Design Choice
The sentence reduction rulings that discussed changes in prison conditions during
the pandemic unearth important but often overlooked choices for sentencing systems: (1)
whether to understand conditions of confinement as a determinant of punitive effect, and,
if so, (2) how to respond when conditions become more restrictive. These questions
implicate federal law’s requirements of parsimony and proportionality. However, federal
statutes’ formal designation of imprisonment as a single type of penalty provided judges
with ambiguous guidance on how to proceed. Comparing judges’ approaches during the
COVID-19 pandemic reveals the challenges that result from different responses to these
questions.
1. Sentencing purposes, parsimony, and proportionality
The contemporary federal sentencing system combines aspects of multiple theories
of punishment. Federal law commands judges to craft sentences that will deter future
criminal conduct, incapacitate people convicted of crimes to protect the safety of others,
facilitate rehabilitation, and provide for “just punishment,” i.e., retribution.211
A subsection of the main federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2),
translates these ideas into four sets of sentencing “purposes.”212 The statute does not direct
judges to prioritize one set of purposes over the others.213 Instead, § 3553(a) instructs
judges to “consider . . . the need for the sentence imposed—”
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner[.]214
Judges weigh these sentencing purposes in connection with other sentencing “factors,”
including (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” (2) “the history and
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
213
Id. § 3553(a).
214
Id. § 3553(a)(2). Notably, § 3582(a) prohibits judges from invoking rehabilitation as a reason for
sentencing someone to prison. Id. § 3582(a) (“The court, in determining whether to impose a term of
imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the term, shall
consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing that
imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.”).
211
212
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characteristics of the defendant,” (3) “the kinds of sentences available,” (4) the applicable
ranges of recommended penalties in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, (5) policy statements
issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, (6) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct,” and (7) “the need to provide restitution to any victims.”215
Federal law requires judges to craft sentences that, measured by these purposes and
factors, are parsimonious and proportionate. The parsimony requirement comes directly
from the text of § 3553(a), which states that judges must “impose a sentence sufficient, but
not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in [§ 3553(a)(2).]”216 The
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and
unusual punishments” as implying a “narrow proportionality principle” that “forbids only
extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate.’”217
The sets of penalties available dictate how federal judges calibrate sentences to meet
these requirements. Judges decide how much punishment is sufficient first by selecting
between or combining terms of imprisonment, probation, or supervised release.218 Judges
then use the duration of these terms to measure the magnitude or severity of punishment.
For terms of probation or supervised release, judges possess discretion to set specific
conditions, such as restrictions on travel or requirements to obtain employment or undergo
drug testing.219 Judges also set the amounts of fines and, when applicable, restitution
payments.220
Most federal criminal sentences include terms of imprisonment, and the duration of
a term of imprisonment is therefore the focus of most federal sentencing proceedings. In
the fiscal year 2021, there were over 57,000 federal criminal sentences; over 91% of these
sentences included a term of imprisonment.221 In other words, the duration of imprisonment
is federal judges’ primary tool for measuring the severity of punishment.
Federal statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines provide structure to help judges craft
sentences that are parsimonious and proportionate. Statutes addressing the authorized
penalties for specific offenses, known as statutes of conviction, authorize increasing ranges
of penalties for more serious offenses. The Sentencing Guidelines provide narrower ranges
of recommended penalties through sentencing tables that match two types of case-specific
215

Id. § 3553(a).
Id.
217
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Court rarely finds
sentences to be disproportionate as a matter of constitutional doctrine. For example, the Court held in 2003
that a twenty-five-year term of imprisonment for stealing three golf clubs worth approximately $1,200 in
total was not disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment, because the person sentenced had prior felony
convictions. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17–20 (2003).
218
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“points”—criminal history points and offense levels—with ranges of penalties (terms of
probation, imprisonment, and supervised release, as well as amounts of fines).222 Criminal
history points relate to a person’s prior involvement with the criminal legal system, such
as past convictions.223 Offense levels relate to the details of a particular offense, such as
the statute of conviction, or whether a weapon was used.224 The recommended penalty
tables use a person’s “criminal history category” as the x-axis and “offense level” as the yaxis to chart recommended sentences.225 For example, the Guidelines table for terms of
imprisonment recommends 24–30 months in prison for a person with a criminal history
category of III and an offense level of 15; the recommendation increases to 30–37 months
if the criminal history category is IV, or to 27–33 months if the offense level is 16.226
Even with this structure, assessing whether a given sentence meets the requirements
of parsimony and proportionality is an imprecise task. The different sentencing purposes
specified in § 3553(a)(2) correspond with different ways of understanding the magnitude
of punishment that a sentence carries out.227 The durations of terms of imprisonment,
probation, and supervised release—as well as the amounts of fines—communicate greater
or lesser messages of deterrence and of moral approbation. A longer term of imprisonment
also incapacitates a person from causing direct physical harm to people outside prison.
Meanwhile, terms of probation and supervised release also further incapacitation, albeit in
a different manner.228 Specific supervision conditions, such as a prohibition on holding an
accounting job for a person convicted of fraud, implement different forms and degrees of
incapacitation. As to rehabilitation, depending on the resources available inside or outside
of prisons, terms of imprisonment or probation provide different degrees of support. At the
same time, § 3553(a)(1)’s requirement that judges consider “the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” instructs judges to
individualize the evaluation of sentencing purposes in each case. In this way, the
contemporary federal sentencing framework leaves judges with considerable latitude to
focus on different facts or sentencing purposes when measuring the appropriate penalties
in specific cases.
222
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2. The ambiguous status of imprisonment as a single type of penalty
Contemporary federal statutes appear to designate imprisonment as a single type of
penalty, creating an ambiguity that generally goes unnoticed at sentencing proceedings.
During initial sentencing hearings, judges measure sentence duration by comparing a
person’s conduct and criminal history against the facts underlying sentences handed down
in other cases and against the Sentencing Guidelines. In this framework, judges have little
reason to pause and consider the conditions of confinement a person might experience.229
In other words, the question at the forefront of judges’ minds is some form of “should this
sentence be as long as the sentence imposed in another case”—not, “what does the
experience of imprisonment entail?”
However, understanding imprisonment as effecting a single type or degree of
punishment is not a necessary feature of sentencing systems. The BOP uses five “security
levels” to categorize federal prisons: minimum, low, medium, high, and administrative.230
The BOP’s security levels correspond with different degrees of restrictions on movement
and access to services. For instance, the BOP describes minimum-security facilities, also
called Federal Prison Camps, as featuring “dormitory housing” and “limited or no
perimeter fencing.”231 The BOP also states that minimum-security facilities are “work- and
program-oriented.”232 By contrast, high-security facilities, also known as United States
Penitentiaries, “have highly secured perimeters” and feature “close control of inmate
movement.”233
Currently, the BOP assigns people to prisons after a court imposes a sentence.234
However, Congress could enact a statute that brings security levels more directly into the
sentencing process and within judges’ purview. For example, Congress could authorize
higher security levels only for certain convictions, require sentencing courts to make
decisions about prison security levels, or mandate that the BOP provide sentencing judges
with detailed information about the conditions in prisons to which people are likely to serve
their sentences. 235
Moreover, federal and state statutes have authorized judges to specify certain
conditions of confinement as parts of sentences in the past. Although these examples
involve authority to impose suffering, they illustrate that treating imprisonment as a single
form of punishment is not an inevitable feature of sentencing systems. From 1798 through
1909, federal statutes authorized judges to sentence people to imprisonment at hard labor,
229

As discussed below, even if federal judges wanted to envision what conditions of confinement particular
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recommendation concerning the type of prison facility appropriate for the defendant”).

32

Vol. 18:1]

Skylar Albertson

i.e., forced—and brutal—physical labor.236 This statutory framework meant that prison
conditions sometimes took on legal significance in a manner that treated different forms of
imprisonment as different forms of punishment. For example, in Ex Parte Wilson, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that hard labor is an “infamous punishment” within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment and therefore triggers the right to presentment or indictment by a
grand jury.237 For similar reasons, the Supreme Court held in In re Bonner that it was
unlawful to imprison a person serving a federal sentence in a state penitentiary unless
imprisonment in a state penitentiary is “specifically prescribed, or where the imprisonment
ordered is for a period longer than one year, or at hard labor.”238 According to the Court,
the government’s proposition that a valid conviction negates challenges to the place of
imprisonment was “certainly not to be tolerated.”239 As the Court explained, the
government’s position would mean that “[i]mprisonment might be accompanied with
inconceivable misery and mental suffering, by its solitary character, or other attending
circumstances.”240 In addition to hard labor, some states authorized judges in the past to
specify solitary confinement or diets of bread and water as components of sentences.241
In a more recent set of cases, federal judges relied on a provision of the Sentencing
Guidelines to impose shorter prison terms at initial sentencings in response to violent
incidents or predictions about vulnerability to violence. By doing so, these judges treated
imprisonment that includes certain types of violent acts, or risks of violence, as imposing
more punishment than imprisonment that involves less violence. For these judges, federal
statutes’ designation of imprisonment as a single type of penalty did not mean that
imprisonment always carries out the same amount of punishment.
In 1989, for example, a judge imposed a shorter sentence upon finding that a person
“look[ed] sixteen [years old]” and would therefore be “particularly vulnerable” to attacks
by other imprisoned people.242 According to the sentencing court, officials at the jail in
236
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which the person was detained pending trial had resorted to “placing [the person] in solitary
confinement,” for fear that the person would be attacked if held elsewhere in the jail.243 At
the time, the Sentencing Guidelines were binding on federal judges, and judges could hand
down sentences shorter than what the Guidelines’ sentencing tables recommended only
upon finding: (1) a basis for a “downward departure” enumerated in the Guidelines; or (2)
“an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the . . . [G]uidelines.”244 The court concluded that “[e]xtreme
vulnerability of criminal defendants is a factor that was not adequately considered by the
Commission and a proper ground for departure.”245
In 1996, the Supreme Court endorsed this approach when it upheld the application
of downward departures for the former police officers who beat Rodney King.246
According to the Court, the sentencing judge had acted in accordance with the Guidelines
when concluding that the former officers were “particularly likely to be targets of abuse
during their incarceration” and should therefore serve shorter prison terms.247
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on U.S. prisons and the FSA’s amendments
to § 3582(c) created a perfect storm that laid bare, in a more sweeping fashion, the puzzles
that result from federal statutes’ treatment of imprisonment as a single type of penalty. By
prompting judges to reassess prison sentences at a time when information about people’s
actual experiences in prison was available,248 § 3582(c) invited judges to expand the
proposition underlying the vulnerability cases—that certain aspects of life inside prison
can turn a sentence into a greater punishment. The life-or-death stakes involved, together
with the short amount of time between the enactment of the FSA and the arrival of the
pandemic, meant that judges needed to act quickly and without the benefit of a large body
of judicial precedents interpreting the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard.
Further, by instructing judges “to reduce” sentences, § 3582(c)’s text shifted the question
of the appropriate remedy from whether a court should order immediate release to how
much of a reduction was warranted.249 Finally, the ubiquity of the pandemic and the
consensus that prisons were uniquely vulnerable to outbreaks of infections may have made
judges more receptive to complaints about conditions of confinement than they would have
otherwise been.
The § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) rulings thus emphasized to judges, in an unprecedented
manner, the reality that prison sentences do not come with uniform conditions of
confinement, and that the day-to-day experience of prison life can change significantly
after a judge has handed down a sentence. A strict insistence on defining imprisonment
243

Lara, 905 F.2d at 601.
See id. at 601–02 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)).
245
Id. at 605.
246
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 111–12 (1996).
247
Id.
248
See Sarah French Russell, Second Looks at Sentences Under the First Step Act, 32 FED. SENT’G REP. 76,
81 (2019) (“In reviewing First Step Act motions, judges will also learn more about the realities of prison
sentences . . . . Judges may hear about prisoners’ lack of access to adequate medical care and rehabilitative
programs, about exposure to violence in the prison, and about time spent locked down in cells or isolated in
solitary confinement.”).
249
See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2020) (“It bears remembering that compassionate
release is a misnomer. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) in fact speaks of sentence reductions. A district court
could, for instance, reduce but not eliminate a defendant’s prison sentence, or end the term of imprisonment
but impose a significant term of probation or supervised release in its place.”).
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without regard to conditions of confinement does not make this reality go away. On the
other hand, achieving consistency and fairness between cases in a system that recognizes
a connection between prison conditions and punitive effect will be challenging as a matter
of design and administration.
Sentencing systems can define imprisonment as including all variations in conditions
of confinement, such that exposure to these variations in conditions is part of what it means
to be punished by imprisonment. In other words, a one-year prison term in this framework
might be described more accurately as a year in prison featuring whatever conditions of
confinement happen to unfold.
By contrast, a system could choose instead to define imprisonment in a manner that
encompasses an understanding that changes in prison conditions correspond with changes
in the amount of punishment that prison carries out. Thus, under this definition of
imprisonment as punishment, both the duration and conditions of a prison term play a role
in determining punitive effect. As discussed below, however, this definition of
imprisonment raises thorny questions regarding how to compare changes in conditions and
duration.
Contemporary federal law does not provide a definite answer between these views
of the relationship between prison conditions and punitive effect, and the judges in the
cases summarized above were forced to grapple with this puzzle amid extraordinary
pressures. The judges who rejected the idea that § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions are an
appropriate vehicle for responding to changes in prison conditions described a system in
which changes in conditions of confinement never bear on the severity or proportionality
of a prison sentence in a manner that is legally cognizable.250 In this model of federal
sentencing, the determinants of punitive effect are the form of a penalty, as specified in a
statute, and the penalty’s duration (or, in the case of a fine or restitution, the amount). To
the extent that prison conditions might be understood as bearing on how much punishment
imprisonment carries out in this model, such relationships are viewed as unquantifiable or,
at the very least, too challenging to measure to justify doing so.
In other words, under this approach, changes in prison conditions may alter the
objective experience of prison, but such changes definitionally cannot alter a sentence’s
punitive effect. If conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment or statutory
protections, imprisoned people may be entitled to damages or injunctive relief. Thus, when
J.C. moved for a reduction on grounds that included inadequate medical care and
“prolonged isolation . . . which affected his mental health,” the court responded that,
“[i]nsofar as [J.C.] seeks judicial review of his conditions of confinement . . . he may file
a civil rights complaint.”251 However, if a person were to obtain release from prison
through an injunction, this would not be because prison turned into too severe of a
punishment in the sense of inflicting too much of a lawful punishment, but rather that
imprisonment had included or become an altogether unlawful form of punishment.252
250

See supra Part I.B.1.
United States v. Carrera, No. 3:14-CR-367 (JJB), 2020 WL 7225997, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2020).
(citing Merlot v. Bergami, 2020 WL 4782058, at *2 (5th Cir. 2020)).
252
Cf. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011) (“A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance,
including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in
civilized society.”); id. at 539–45 (upholding an injunction capping California’s prison population at
137.5% of its prison system’s design capacity because overcrowding was preventing California's prison
system from providing constitutionally adequate medical care).
251
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Accordingly, sentence reductions are not an appropriate remedy for changed prison
conditions in this model.
By contrast, the judges who viewed changes in prison conditions as cognizable in §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i) proceedings—both the judges who required a fit between changed prison
conditions and a specific medical condition and those who did not—described a system in
which conditions of confinement play a role in determining punitive effect. The judges
who required connections to specific medical ailments used the concept of compassionate
release to supply a limiting principle for which people could receive sentence reductions.253
However, both sets of judges endorsed the idea that certain departures outside a normal or
standard range of prison conditions can increase a sentence’s punitive effect and thereby
justify a rebalancing of sentencing purposes to meet § 3553(a)’s parsimony requirement.
All of these interpretations were reasonably available to judges, given federal law’s
silence on the relationship between prison conditions and punitive effect.254 On the one
hand, federal statutes’ designation of imprisonment as a single type of penalty can be read
to suggest that judges should never understand changes in prison conditions as altering
punitive effect. However, the existence of a “safety valve” provision such as §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i) complicates this analysis. The text of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) implies a broad,
equitable power and thereby opens the door to interpretations of “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” for sentence reductions as including changes in prison conditions
understood by Congress, judges, the BOP, and/or the Sentencing Commission to increase
punitive effect. Given the deference that federal law customarily affords to federal judges
for discretionary sentencing matters, interpreting the “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” standard as encompassing at least some of the drastic changes that occurred during
the pandemic was a reasonable application of this text.255
Further, even without § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)’s reference to “extraordinary and
compelling” circumstances, the availability of probation as a penalty impliedly recognizes
that something more than duration determines punitive effect. A year in prison is a greater
punishment than a year of probation because the restrictions and hardships that
imprisonment entails are more severe than those associated with probation. Justice
Blackmun once made an analogous observation, remarking that a term of imprisonment
served in “a prison characterized by rampant violence and terror” is “a more extreme
punishment” than the same amount of time spent in “a relatively safe, well-managed
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See supra Part I.B.3.
This is not an Article about which reading of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) was superior as a matter of statutory
interpretation. Rather, this Article aims to derive lessons from considering the full set of interpretations
together.
255
See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011) (“This Court has long recognized that sentencing
judges ‘exercise a wide discretion’ in the types of evidence they may consider when imposing sentence . . .
. ” (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246–47 (1949)). In July 2022, after the rulings discussed
in Part I.B of this Article had been decided, the Supreme Court held that federal judges presiding over
resentencing proceedings pursuant to § 404 of the First Step Act may “consider intervening changes of law
or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence,” unless statutory language specifically prohibits
such consideration. Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2400–04 (2022). Section 404 of the First
Step Act responded to decreases in the authorized prison terms for crimes involving crack cocaine by
permitting federal judges to “impose a reduced sentence” for people whose initial sentences had been the
product of the old statutes that called for longer sentences. Id. at 2396–97 (citing First Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018)).
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prison.”256 Moreover, as noted above, the cases granting downward departures for
vulnerability to violence—including a decision upheld by the Supreme Court—treated
prison terms that involve certain incidents or risks as carrying out more punishment than
imprisonment that does not include such conditions.257
Some of the rulings summarized above expressly connected changes in prison
conditions to the purposes enumerated in § 3553(a) and thereby constructed theoretical
accounts for why prison conditions might impact punitive effect under federal law.258 For
example, the court that granted M.C.’s motion reasoned that M.C.’s experience dealing
with ulcerative colitis amidst pandemic-era restrictions within prison “significantly
increased [the] deterrent and punitive effect of serving a sentence.”259 In other words,
changes in prison conditions can alter the deterrent message of imprisonment.
Similarly, changes in prison conditions that make the experience of imprisonment
substantially more severe can be understood as increasing a sentence’s retributive effect.
The court that granted D.R.’s motion reasoned that, although immediate release “would
not reflect the seriousness of, or provide just punishment for, his egregious participation in
a brutal murder,” a reduction to a 30-year term of imprisonment would satisfy these
purposes.260
Perhaps most obviously, changes in prison conditions can impact a prison term’s
capacity to facilitate rehabilitation and provide medical and mental health care. For
example, the court that granted S.H.’s motion emphasized in its discussion of the § 3553(a)
factors that “the Court did not envision [S.H.] to serve this term of imprisonment in neartotal lockdown, without the mental health and other support programs that the Court
believes to be critical to her health and ability to reenter society.”261 Likewise, the court
that granted M.Q.’s motion observed that M.Q. “struggled to receive a follow-up
cardiologist appointment for several months,” frustrating “the need for . . . medical care,
or other correctional treatment.”262
Though these rulings did not involve constitutional claims—and a discussion of
whether the Constitution would ever require sentence reductions is beyond the scope of
this Article—it bears noting that some of the literature discussing the Supreme Court’s
Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence has raised the idea that conditions of
confinement can alter punitive effect. For example, Professor Alexander Reinert has
written that judges should release or grant sentence reductions to people who have
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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 855 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Similarly, a member of the
U.S. Sentencing Commission once observed that, “[m]y own experience as a correctional administrator
ma[d]e[] me aware that one month in an institution previously operated by me and one month in some other
institution even in the same state would not result in an equivalent period of time.” Helen G. Corrothers,
The Federal Offender: A Program of Intermediate Punishments, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 23, 25 (199).
257
See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 111–12 (1996) (holding that it was within the district court’s
discretion to grant a downward departure for “susceptibility to abuse in prison”).
258
Professor Alexander Reinert includes similar points in support of his argument that release and sentence
reductions should be available as remedies for past Eighth Amendment violations. See Reinert, infra note,
263, at 1608–22.
259
United States v. Chavis, No. 1:18-CR-481, 2021 WL 2784653, at *4 (M.D.N.C. July 2, 2021).
260
United States v. Rodriguez, 492 F. Supp. 3d 306, 308, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
261
United States v. Hatcher, No. 18-CR-454-10 (KPF), 2021 WL 1535310, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2021).
262
United States v. Qadar, No. 00-CR-603 (ARR), 2021 WL 308-7956, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2021).
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experienced conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment.263 Professor Reinert uses a
hypothetical statute specifying imprisonment with an unconstitutional condition of
confinement to support his argument.264 Under prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine, a
judge could strike down such a statute, at least in part, prior to the start of a prison
sentence.265 However, a person who experienced the same unconstitutional condition of
confinement, but who could not show that it was ongoing, would not obtain release or a
sentence reduction under current doctrine.266 Professor Reinert argues that courts should
interpret the Eighth Amendment to authorize such an individual to obtain release or a
reduction, because certain types of Eighth Amendment violations “exhaust the State’s
authority or capacity to punish.”267
Similarly, Professor Sharon Dolovich has argued that the deliberate indifference
standard fails to recognize the role of prison conditions as punishment. Under the Supreme
Court’s current interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, a prison condition only
counts as punishment for the purposes of an Eighth Amendment claim if it is “inflicted”268–
meaning that it is “formally meted out as punishment” or results from the “deliberate
indifference” of correctional officers.269 As Dolovich observes, this standard ignores that,
“once a person is sentenced to prison . . . she is consigned to the custody of prison officials
whose acts or omissions will determine the conditions under which she will serve her
sentence.”270 In Dolovich’s view, “[i]t is thus implausible to suggest that, because the
particular conditions of . . . confinement are determined by prison officials after the fact
and not by the legislature or the judge . . . those conditions are somehow not part of the
penalty the sentence represents.”271 As a result, although “[w]e are used to thinking of
prison sentences in terms of length . . . the severity of the punishment ultimately depends
on the conditions of confinement.”272
These critiques of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence reflect
that the idea that prison conditions are a determinant of punitive effect is not novel.
However, the Court’s particular interpretation of the word “inflicted,” as it is used in the
Eighth Amendment, has stymied further exploration of this idea in this context. By
contrast, and as noted above, sentencing is an area in which federal district judges possess
considerable discretion, and the Supreme Court has endorsed consideration of at least
263

Alexander A. Reinert, Release as Remedy for Excessive Punishment, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575,
1578 (2012); see also Julia A. Torti, Note, Accounting for Punishment in Proportionality Review, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1945–49 (2013) (arguing that the test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court for
assessing proportionality under the Eighth Amendment should encompass conditions of confinement
because “analyzing the nature of a punishment as if it were separable from a sentence’s length is not
faithful to the lived experience of a prison sentence.”).
264
Reinert, supra note 263, at 1603–07.
265
Id. at 1603.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
The full text of the Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
269
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299–303 (1991).
270
Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 900
(2009).
271
Id. at 900–01.
272
Id. at 913; see also Torti, supra note 263, at 1934 (“The conditions in which a sentence is served and the
experiences of an inmate in prison both contribute to a sentence’s harshness.”).
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certain prison conditions under § 3553(a).273
3. Challenges for sentence reductions
For systems that choose to offer sentence reductions in response to changes in prison
conditions, the pandemic-era § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) rulings highlighted the complexity of
measuring and comparing how changes in prison conditions impact punitive effect. The
cases underscore that, while the proposition that prison conditions bear on how much
punishment a sentence carries out might appear simple, quantifying how much particular
changes alter punitive effect is highly subjective.274
Although judges acknowledged that all people in federal custody endured the
hardships of lockdowns and other pandemic-related restrictions, no judge interpreted the
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard as applying to all people held in federal
prisons. Instead, judges sought to articulate reasons that distinguished the experiences of
certain people as justifying sentence reductions. However, the rulings do not reflect an
organized framework regarding which people should receive sentence reductions, of what
size, and in response to what types of changes.275 For example, the rulings do not attempt
to articulate a rule for translating time spent in lockdowns into the size of sentence
reductions. One judge wrote that “[a] two-week confinement in solitary quarantine in a
higher security facility is the equivalent of two months in [a minimum-security] Camp,”
but provided no methodology or rationale for this conclusion.276
Further, § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s requirement that judges reassess the § 3553(a) factors
meant that the same changes in prison conditions could justify sentence reductions for some
people but not for others. Many judges, after finding that a person demonstrated
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” through changed prison conditions, declined to

See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 111–12 (1996). In addition, “[a]lthough the modern Supreme
Court has not engaged in a rigorous analysis of conditions of confinement during proportionality review,
some historical precedents can be read as engaging in this type of analysis, and no decisions have
foreclosed it.” Torti, supra note 263, at 1936 (discussing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), and
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)).
274
The subjective nature of this inquiry creates opportunities for biased or otherwise arbitrary decisionmaking. As noted above, critics of the federal parole system argued that the broad discretion afforded to the
U.S. Parole Commission led to racially disparate outcomes, and reports have documented racially disparate
outcomes in contemporary state parole systems. See Stith & Koh, supra note 47; Race and Noncapital
Sentencing, supra note 47; Winerip, Schwirtz, & Gebeloff, supra note 47.
275
This problem of inconsistent application is not unique to § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) rulings that treat changes in
prison conditions as a determinant of punitive effect. According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Data
Report for all § 3582(c)(1)(A) rulings during 2020 and 2021, grant rates varied considerably by federal
judicial district. Among districts with over 200 such rulings, grant rates ranged from 1.7% (Southern
District of Mississippi: 12 out of 207 motions granted) to 40.0% (District of Connecticut: 86 of 215). The
range of grant rates was also broad among the seven districts with over 500 rulings, ranging from 4.6%
(Northern District of Texas: 25 of 542) to 34.2% (District of Maryland: 193 of 564). Compassionate
Release Data Report, supra note 115, at 5 tbl. 2. In certain districts, such as Connecticut, higher grant rates
resulted, at least in part, from large outbreaks of infections at nearby BOP facilities. See Memorandum for
Director of Bureau of Prison: Increasing Use of Home Confinement at Institutions Most Affected by
COVID-19, OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1266661/download (identifying FCI Danbury, located in Connecticut, as
among the BOP facilities “experiencing significant levels of infection”).
276
United States v. MacFarlane, 438 F. Supp. 3d 125, 127 (D. Mass. 2020).
273
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order sentence reductions upon finding that other § 3553(a) factors predominated.277
In the ruling addressing motions filed by three people held at FCI Fort Dix,
conditions at the same prison during the same time period did not correspond with equal
reductions. According to the court, all three people contracted COVID-19 due in part to
the missteps of correctional officials, “endured terrible living conditions . . . [for] several
months,” and faced barriers to communicating with the outside world. 278 Yet, the court
determined, through application of the § 3553(a) factors, that a six-month reduction was
warranted for one of the three people—instead of the nine-month reductions ordered for
the other two—because the third person “ha[d] a significant criminal history for violence”
and “[h]is bout with the virus was not severe.”279
Judge Posner anticipated analogous challenges in his article, An Economic Theory of
the Criminal Law. In the course of theorizing how to construct optimally efficient criminal
penalties, Judge Posner observes that “the severity of punishment can be varied other than
by varying the length of imprisonment” by accounting for certain aspects of life in prison,
such as “[s]ize of prison cell, temperature, and quality of food.”280 However, Judge Posner
concludes that, “this would make information about sanctions very costly, because there
would be so many dimensions to evaluate.”281 In contrast, “[t]ime has the attractive
characteristic of being one-dimensional.”282
Likewise, Professor Reinert refers to the challenge of translating the magnitude of
Eighth Amendment violations into the duration of reductions as “the commensurability
problem.”283 Relying on the vulnerability-to-violence decisions for support, Reinert
reasons that “[c]ommensurability is a complex problem, but it is not impossible to resolve
judicially.”284 According to Reinert, “[c]ourts might rely on a framework similar to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines so that particular kinds of mistreatment are associated with
different levels of reductions.”285
Of course, whether to authorize sentence reductions for changes in prison conditions
is not an all-or-nothing proposition. A comparison to federal law concerning the duration
of prison sentences is instructive. Statutory limits strictly circumscribe the duration of
terms of imprisonment; one day over a statutory limit is illegal.286 In addition, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment as requiring juries to find any facts that alter
statutory durational ranges.287 When compared with these strict rules governing the
duration of imprisonment, offering reductions for at least certain types of changes in prison
conditions might represent a modest effort to enforce parsimony and proportionality.
277

See supra Part I.B.2.
United States v. Newell, Nos. 1:13-CR-165-1, 1:15-CR-362-1, 1:13-CR-214-2, 2021 WL 3269650, at
*2–4, *9, *13 (M.D.N.C. July 30, 2021), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v. Burr, No. 21-7193,
2021 WL 9299047 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 2021).
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Id. at *13.
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Posner, supra note 129, at 1212.
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Id.
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Id.
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Reinert, supra note 263, at 1628–30.
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Id. (citing United States v. Francis, 129 F. Supp. 2d 612, 619–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United States v.
Pressley, 345 F.3d 1205, 1219 (11th Cir. 2003); and United States v. Rodriguez, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1298,
1303 (M.D. Ala. 2002)) (other citations omitted).
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Reinert, supra note 263, at 1623.
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See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013).
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Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10 (2000)).
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Compassionate release mechanisms with clear criteria for immediate release are one
piece of this puzzle. These types of provisions advance parsimony by identifying people
for whom any continued imprisonment would be too great of a punishment. The BOP
appeared to have this type of mechanism in mind when it issued memoranda and
regulations implementing § 3582(c). Although the OIG report found that the BOP’s criteria
were unduly stringent, the push for clear criteria reflects an appropriate concern for
avoiding inconsistent or arbitrary outcomes across cases.
A statute enacted in New Jersey and bill proposed in Delaware raise the possibility
of using standardized sentence credits to address certain prison conditions.288 Under New
Jersey’s statute, if a declared public health emergency causes “substantial modifications to
department-wide correctional facility operations,” then people who are within 365 days of
release receive “public health emergency credits” for “122 days for each month . . . served
during the declared emergency.”289 The statute caps credits at 244 days and excludes
people convicted of certain offenses from receiving credits.290 In effect, the statute
represents a legislative judgment that a day in prison during a public health emergency is
equivalent to approximately four days in prison under normal circumstances. When the
statute first went into effect in November 2020, over 2,000 people became eligible for
release.291 Delaware’s bill, introduced in December 2020, would have awarded “Public
health emergency credits” to reduce sentences by “182 days for each month, or portion
thereof served during the declared [COVID-19] emergency.”292 However, the bill did not
reach a full vote.293
These types of provisions could be adapted to automate sentence credits for more
easily measurable aspects of prison life, such as lockdowns. Once more is known about the
frequency, nature, and causes of these types of restrictions, legislators could consider using
this information to expand existing sentence credit systems to address time spent in facilityor unit-wide lockdowns. One potential organizing principle would be to link credits to the
number of hours people are confined to their cells. For example, if people in a particular
prison system are generally permitted to be outside of their cells for up to 15 hours each
day, then each day spent with only three hours permitted out of cell might result in a fourday credit (treating the day spent with only three hours out of cell as equivalent to five days
in prison not under lockdown). Alternatively, a credit system could grant different types of
lockdown credits depending on which aspects of prison life are suspended during the
288

In addition, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ordered a one-time award of
credits for time spent in prison during the COVID-19 pandemic. Memorandum, Positive Programming
Credits, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB. (July 9, 2020), https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/covid19/memo-positiveprogramming-credits/. However, this policy did not respond directly to the harshness of living under
lockdowns but instead to the fact that lockdowns had prevented people from completing credit-bearing
programs. See id; see also Emily Widra & Wanda Bertram, More States Need to Use Their “Good Time”
Systems to Get People Out of Prison During COVID-19, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/01/12/good-time/.
289
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.100(a) (2020).
290
Id. at (c)–(d).
291
See Tracey Tully, 2,258 N.J. Prisoners Will Be Released in a Single Day, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/nyregion/nj-prisoner-release-covid.html.
292
An Act to Amend Title 11 of the Delaware Code Relating to Public Health Emergency Credits, H.B. 37,
151st Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2020), https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?LegislationId=48220.
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Id. (reflecting no events under “Action History” after “4/1/21,” the date of which corresponds to the last
action of “Assigned to Appropriations Committee in House”) (last visited July 20, 2022).
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lockdown. For example, a lockdown that interferes with the provision of medical care or
visits from friends and family might trigger more credits than a lockdown that does not
interfere with these aspects of imprisonment.
Moreover, the fact that some aspects of prison life, such as the hardships of living
with a serious illness, are less conducive to comparative measurement does not mean that
sentence reductions could never take them into account. Much of sentencing involves a
degree of arbitrary line-drawing—whether at the moment a legislature decides that the
maximum term for a given offense should be set at fifteen years, as opposed to ten or
twenty years; or when a judge determines that a person’s “history and characteristics”294
justify a slightly shorter prison term. For aspects of prison life that require a greater amount
of subjective decision-making, legislators and other policymakers should consider
recommended sentencing ranges of the type used in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.295
As discussed below, however, thorough data collection and analysis concerning prison
conditions is a prerequisite for informed decisions regarding whether and how to respond
to changes within prisons.
B. Transparency Surrounding Prison Conditions Relates to the Fairness of Sentences
The rulings discussed in this Article illustrate that information about prison
conditions matters not only for the wellbeing of incarcerated people and enforcing
constitutional and statutory protections, but also for ensuring parsimony and
proportionality in sentencing. As summarized above, several of the judges who addressed
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions—including judges who denied such requests—determined that
changes in prison conditions during the pandemic upended the balances they had struck at
initial sentencings.296 Thus, in systems that recognize prison conditions as a determinant of
punitive effect, a clear understanding of conditions of confinement is a prerequisite for
ensuring that sentences do not become greater punishments after they commence.
Moreover, by highlighting the aspects of the pandemic’s impact that judges connected to
294

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
The Sentencing Commission once considered including “exchange rates” in the Guidelines Manual
comparing time spent in “intermediate punishments” with time spent in prison. See Corrothers, supra note
256, at 24–25. For example, “Home Detention” would have had the “equivalency to imprisonment of 2
days to 1 day of prison,” and a six-month “Regimented Discipline Unit (Shock Incarceration/Boot Camp”
would have served as a “substitute for the period of from 12 to 30 months in prison.” Id. at 24.
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See, e.g., United States v. Olawoye, 477 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1166 (D. Or. 2020) (“The sentence defendant
has served has undoubtedly been harsher than the one originally contemplated at the time of sentencing.”);
United States v. Newell, Nos. 1:13-CR-165-1, 1:15-CR-362-1, 1:13-CR-214-2, 2021 WL 3269650, at *13
(M.D.N.C. July 30, 2021) appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v. Burr, No. 21-7193, 2021 WL
9299047 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 2021) (“[T]he conditions of confinement during this time were substantially
more punitive than was contemplated at the time of sentencing.”); United States v. Hatcher, No. 18 Cr.
454-10 (KPF), 2021 WL 1535310, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2021) (“[T]he Court did not envision [S.H.] to
serve this term of imprisonment in near-total lockdown, without the mental health and other support
programs that the Court believes to be critical to her health and ability to reenter society.”); United States v.
Pacheco, No. 12-CR-408 (JMF), 2020 WL 4350257, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2020) (“On February 12,
2020, the Court found that an eight-month sentence was sufficient, but no greater than necessary, to achieve
the purposes of sentencing,” but “[t]he balance weighs differently . . . in the current circumstances.”);
United States v. Mel, No. TDC-18-0571, 2020 WL 2041674, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 28, 2020) (“Indeed, the
actual severity of the sentence as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak exceeds what the Court anticipated at
the time of sentencing.”).
295

42

Vol. 18:1]

Skylar Albertson

punitive effect, the rulings suggest priorities for data collection.
This rationale for increased transparency is also consistent with at least some
frameworks that choose to define punitive effect solely by duration. If a sentencing
system’s motivation for adopting a narrow definition of punitive effect is to avoid the
challenges of administering remedies, then minimizing fluctuations in conditions should
remain a policy priority. In other words, if policymakers adopt some version of Judge
Posner’s thesis—that many aspects of prison life might moderate how much punishment
imprisonment carries out, but quantifying this relationship is not feasible—they should still
seek to minimize situations where a person receives a greater punishment than what a
sentencing judge intended.
Below, this Part discusses three interrelated aspects of the pandemic’s consequences
for life in prison that stand out from the rulings that granted reductions: lockdowns, medical
care, and social contact. Increasing transparency regarding these aspects of prison life will
remain important even after the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic fades. Although the
simultaneity of changes in prisons across the United States was a unique result of the
pandemic, the types of changes that captured judges’ attention occurred before the
pandemic and will reoccur in the future.
Additionally, thorough data collection is an important step toward incorporating
prison conditions into the Sentencing Guidelines, should Congress or the Sentencing
Commission choose to do so in the future. When “the practical and philosophical problems
of developing a coherent sentencing system” threatened to stymie the creation of the first
Guidelines Manual, the Sentencing Commission turned to an “empirical approach”—
effectively reverse-engineering much of the Guidelines from past sentencing data.297
Similarly, it is only through broad, ongoing data collection that an entity such as the
Sentencing Commission could fully understand the problems that reductions for prison
conditions would seek to address.
1. Lockdowns and other restrictions on movement
The first aspect of the pandemic’s impact that stands out in the rulings is the degree
to which officials restricted movement within prisons. The most extreme forms of this type
of restriction are known as facility- or unit-wide “lockdowns.” The idea that restrictions on
movement within prisons might transform imprisonment into a different type of
punishment is consistent with existing distinctions in federal law between imprisonment;
probation or supervised release with restrictions on movement (such as curfews or home
confinement), which require additional judicial findings298; and probation or supervised
release without such restrictions. These distinctions are premised on degrees of restriction
on movement. Further, as discussed above, the BOP classifies prisons according to
“security levels” corresponding with degrees of control over movement. Similar ideas also
appear in the context of federal habeas corpus doctrine, with some circuits authorizing writs
“[i]f the prisoner is seeking what can fairly be described as a quantum change in the level

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b) (requiring additional findings for discretionary conditions of probation), 3583(d)
(requiring additional findings for the imposition of § 3563(b) conditions as conditions of supervised
release).
297
298
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of custody.”299 These decisions reflect an understanding that different degrees of
restrictions on movement correspond with objectively different experiences of
incarceration.300
In the § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) rulings, judges expressed concern regarding both the toll
that isolation and restrictions on movement might cause directly and the ways in which
such restrictions interfere with medical care.301 For example, the court in M.Q.’s case
observed that “Otisville’s lockdown—which has lasted in one form or another for 16
months—has prevented [M.Q.] from adequately managing his hypertension and prediabetes.”302 However, given that federal courts have interpreted federal law as permitting
the use of solitary confinement for safety and discipline within prisons,303 an important
caveat is in order: judges were concerned with restrictions on movement that did not result
from accusations or findings of misconduct. The court in J.J.R.’s case made this distinction
explicit, stating: “More importantly, [placing] Defendant in solitary confinement for the
indefinite future to protect him from contracting COVID-19 is a severe and extreme
measure . . . . Defendant is isolated in his cell for 22.5 hours a day, despite his elderly age
and good behavior.”304
The scale, duration, and precise nature of lockdowns in prisons across the United
States during the pandemic remain unclear. Reports and details of lockdowns during the
pandemic made their way into media reports and some judicial decisions, but there does
not appear to be any systematic, empirical accounting of the lockdowns. For example, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in an opinion published on June 2, 2020, stated that
“the commissioner [of the Massachusetts Department of Correction] initiated a systemwide lockdown” on April 3, 2020, and “[s]ince then, inmates who live in cells have been
spending twenty-three hours per day in their cells, while inmates living in dormitory-style
housing have been unable to leave their units.”305 Yet, information about the duration of
this lockdown and other details of its impact do not appear to be readily accessible to the
public. Likewise, when a November 2020 press release announced that the Massachusetts
Department of Correction was reinstituting “modified operations,” the press release did not
explain the nature of these restrictions, such as how many hours per day people would be
confined to their cells or units.306
299

See, e.g., Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 873–74 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Graham v.
Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991)).
300
See Graham, 922 F.2d at 381 (describing “a quantum change in the level of custody” as a change in the
level of custody that implicates “outright freedom, or freedom subject to the limited reporting and financial
constraints of bond or parole or probation, or the run of the prison in contrast to the approximation to
solitary confinement that is disciplinary segregation”).
301
See supra Part I.B.3, 4.
302
United States v. Qadar, No. 00-CR-603 (ARR), 2021 WL 3087956, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2021).
303
See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685–86 (1978) (endorsing the district court’s statement that
“punitive isolation ‘is not necessarily unconstitutional, but it may be, depending on the duration of the
confinement and the conditions thereof’” (quoting Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 275 (E.D. Ark.
1976)).
304
United States v. Regas, 3:91-cr-00057-MMD-NA-1, 2020 WL 2926457, at *3 (D. Nev. June 3, 2020).
305
Foster v. Comm’r of Corr., 146 N.E.3d 372, 382 (Mass. 2020).
306
DOC Implements Modified Operations at Facilities Statewide: Comprehensive COVID-19 Testing is
Ongoing for All Inmates and Staff, MASS. DEP’T OF CORR. (Nov. 14, 2020),
https://www.mass.gov/news/doc-implements-modified-operations-at-facilities-statewide. Other prison
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Lockdowns were frequent occurrences at many prisons before the pandemic—for
reasons that included staffing shortages, maintenance problems, and violence—and will
continue to occur after the pandemic. For example, a 2014 investigation by the Department
of Justice “into the treatment of adolescent male inmates, between the ages of 16 and 18”
at jails on New York City’s Rikers Island documented that one of the jails “frequently
[was] placed in locked down status and inmates are confined to their cells.”307 According
to the report, “[i]n FY 2013 alone, there were 1,118 responses to emergency alarms” in two
of the jails, “or an average of more than three alarms each day.”308 From late January into
early February 2019, people detained at a federal jail in Brooklyn “were held on partial
lockdown” after “plummeting temperatures caused parts of the heating system to fail,” and
an electrical fire “put the facility on ‘emergency power.’”309 In 1983, U.S. Penitentiary
Marion was put into a lockdown that would last over twenty years—effectively converting
the prison from a medium- to a maximum-security facility—following multiple
homicides.310 More recently, in early 2022, the BOP placed the entire federal prison system
on “a nationwide lockdown” in response to a deadly fight at a federal prison in Texas that
officials suspected was related to gang involvement.311 That lockdown lasted at least a
week at all BOP prisons and extended for multiple weeks at some prisons.312 However,
little information is available regarding the frequency and causes of lockdowns outside of
sporadic reports.
The dearth of public information about lockdowns parallels the limited availability
of information about solitary confinement in the United States. Since 2014, the
Correctional Leaders Association and the Liman Center for Public Interest Law at Yale
Law School have conducted biennial surveys on the use of “restrictive housing,” defined
as the practice of isolating a person in a cell for twenty-two or more hours per day on

systems have published less information about the impact of the pandemic on their prisons. See MICHELE
DEITCH & WILLIAM BUCKNALL, COVID, CORRECTIONS, AND OVERSIGHT PROJECT, HIDDEN FIGURES:
RATING THE COVID DATA TRANSPARENCY OF PRISONS, JAILS & JUVENILE AGENCIES (Mar. 2021),
https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/publications/2021-hidden-figures--rating-the-covid-data-transparency-ofprisons-jails-and-juvenile-agencies/download (rating the transparency of state prison systems’ COVID data
dashboards). Indeed, current data transparency efforts by the Massachusetts Department of Correction for
certain metrics might be a model for other U.S. prison systems. The Department’s website features an
interactive “DOC COVID-19 Cell Housing Dashboard” that provides information, by prison, on the
number of people “who are housed in a cell: (i) alone; (ii) with one . . . other person; or (iii) with two . . . or
more other people.” DOC COVID-19 Institution Cell Housing Dashboard, MASS. DEP’T OF CORR.,
https://www.mass.gov/info-details/doc-covid-19-institution-cell-housing-dashboard (last visited July 21,
2022). The site is updated weekly, and site visitors can browse past data for each day since the launch of
the dashboard. See id. Including metrics pertaining to lockdowns in data dashboards of this kind would
present an important step forward for transparency surrounding life in prison.
307
CRIPA INVESTIGATION, supra note 5, at 8.
308
Id.
309
Benjamin Weiser & Annie Correal, Brooklyn Jail to Be Visited by Federal Judge After Heat and Power
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/nyregion/lawsuit-brooklynjail.html.
310
Stephen C. Richard, USP Marion: The First Federal Supermax, 88 PRISON J. 6, 9–10 (2008).
311
Katie Benner, Fatal Gang Fight Spurts Nationwide Lockdown of Federal Prison System, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 31, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/31/us/politics/ms13-texas-prison-fight.html.
312
Temporary Security Measures Lifted: Facilities Returned to Modified Operational Status, FED. BUREAU
OF PRISONS (Feb. 24, 2022, 12:09 PM),
https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/20220201_security_measures.jsp.
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average and for fifteen or more consecutive days, in prisons across the United States.313
These surveys are among a small group of efforts to create national counts of the use of
solitary confinement in the United States.314 However, their voluntary nature comes with
limitations. The surveys rely on self-reported data from correctional agencies without a
mechanism for corroborating responses, and not all prison systems participate.315
Yet, efforts to track the use of solitary confinement may also provide cause for
optimism when it comes to increasing transparency concerning lockdowns. The CLALiman surveys asked prison systems whether they regularly kept and reviewed data relating
to solitary confinement, and, if so, when they began tracking this data.316 Survey responses
indicated that several jurisdictions that once did not track how they used solitary
confinement began producing and monitoring this type of data in recent years.317 In
addition, legislatures across the country have proposed bills that would require prison
systems to collect and publish data on the use of solitary confinement, and at least fourteen
states have enacted such statutes since 2018.318 In the federal system, the FSA included a
provision requiring the BOP to report “the number of prisoners who have been placed in
solitary confinement at any time during the previous year.”319 Similar efforts focused on
lockdowns could lead to improved practices with respect to the collection and publication
of data related to lockdowns. In fact, two of the newest pieces of enacted legislation
addressing solitary confinement include provisions that will also require prison officials to
report information about lockdowns.320
See CORR. LEADERS ASS’N & ARTHUR LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INT. L. AT YALE L. SCH., TIME-IN-CELL
2021: A SNAPSHOT OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING BASED ON A NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF U.S. PRISON SYSTEMS
1–4 (Aug. 2022), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/time_in_cell_2021.pdf
[hereinafter SNAPSHOT].
314
The Vera Institute of Justice has collected data on the use of isolation in U.S. Jails. See CHASE
MONTAGNET, JENNIFER PEIRCE, & DAVID PITTS, VERA INST. OF JUST., MAPPING U.S. JAILS’ USE OF
RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: TRENDS, DISPARITIES, AND OTHER FORMS OF LOCKDOWN (Apr. 2021),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/mapping-us-jails-use-of-restrictive-housing.pdf.
315
SNAPSHOT, supra note 313, at 2–4.
316
Id. at 12–13.
317
See id.
318
Judith Resnik, Jenny Carroll, Skylar Albertson, & Sarita Benesch, Legislative Regulation of Isolation in
Prison: 2018-2021, SSRN (Dec. 22, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3914942.
319
First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 610(a)(2), 132 Stat. 5194, 5246 (2018).
320
Connecticut’s PROTECT Act defines a “lockdown” as “the enforced detainment of all incarcerated
persons within such persons’ cells imposed upon an entire correctional facility or part of such facility, other
than for the purpose of administrative meetings.” Conn. Pub. Act. No. 22-18 §§ (a)(7)(C)(8) (2022). Under
the terms of the PROTECT Act, Connecticut’s Department of Correction must report, by January 1, 2024,
“measures taken by the department to address . . . [t]he frequency, cause and duration of lockdowns.” Id. §
(h)(1). In addition, the PROTECT Act limits lockdowns imposed “for purposes of training department
staff” to no more than “twenty-four cumulative hours during any thirty-day period.” Id. § (g). Voters in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, approved a ballot initiative that imposed limits and reporting
requirements for lockdowns at the Allegheny County Jail, one of the largest jails in the United States. See
ALLEGHENY CNTY., REPORT TO THE JAIL OVERSIGHT BOARD PURSUANT TO ALLEGHENY CNTY CODE
CHAPTER SECTION 205-30 FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY 2022, at 2 (Feb. 2022),
https://www.alleghenycounty.us/uploadedFiles/Allegheny_Home/DeptContent/Jail/Docs/Reports/JOB%20Segregated%20Housing%20Report%20February%202022.pdf. Reports
published pursuant to the new requirement have documented the continued use of lockdowns in response to
new waves of COVID-19 infections. Id. at 5 (“The jail continued to be in full lockdown from February 1
through February 28, during which time all incarcerated individuals experienced limited time out-of-cell.”).
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2. Medical and mental health care

The second interrelated dimension of prison that stands out from the §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i) rulings is the delivery of medical and mental health services. For example,
the judge in S.H.’s case emphasized that, “due to the extreme lockdown conditions at the
MCC and the MDC, S.H. has been unable to receive mental health care, drug abuse
treatment, and other important services that the Court envisioned her receiving.”321
Similarly, the judge in M.C.’s case reasoned that delays in the diagnosis and treatment of
M.C.’s medical conditions played a role in “significantly increas[ing]” the “deterrent and
punitive effect” of his prison sentence.322 These judges’ statements reflect an understanding
that officials’ ability to provide adequate medical and mental health care plays an important
role in constituting prison as punishment.
Ongoing efforts by many actors and institutions focus on medical and mental health
care in prisons, including the specific problem of barriers to information. For example, the
organization Incarceration Transparency, led by Professor Andrea Armstrong, collected
and analyzed data on the number of people who died in Louisiana prisons between 2015
and 2019 and the reasons for their deaths.323 Prior to the group’s 2021 report, data on deaths
in custody in Louisiana disaggregated by cause of death, facility, race, age, or length of
stay did not exist.324 Members of Incarceration Transparency also partnered with medical
professionals to produce a report on prison medical care for the Louisiana State Legislature
calling for “standardized healthcare policies and practices across all state prisons.”325
The § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) rulings discussing the impact of the pandemic on medical and
mental health care suggest that the idea that substandard medical care can increase a
sentence’s punitive effect should be counted among the reasons for transparency. The
decisions also point to specific metrics that might persuade judges or other decisionmakers, such as delays in obtaining diagnostic care and referrals to specialty care, and
suspensions of access to exercise areas and health-related programming.326
3. Social isolation
The third interrelated dimension of prison that stands out from the judges’ decisions
is social isolation. For example, the court addressing the motions of three people held at
FCI Fort Dix took issue not only with the physical dimension of lockdowns but also with
the “isolation from the outside world” that the people had endured, including “almost non-
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existent” access to telephone calls.327 Similarly, the Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that “[a] day in prison under the current conditions is a qualitatively different type
of punishment than one day in prison used to be,” due to changes that included “restrictive
visitation” and the “end[ ] [of] prison programs.”328
Statements issued by corrections departments relating to their pandemic responses
frequently referenced these types of restrictions. For example, the version of the BOP’s
COVID-19 Modified Operations Plan updated in November 2020 acknowledged that,
“[d]uring modified operations in response to COVID-19, the BOP suspended social
visitation.”329
Empirical studies have documented the importance of positive social contact to the
well-being of incarcerated people. A study analyzing data on people released from prison
in Minnesota between 2003 and 2007 “found that visitation significantly decreased the risk
of recidivism.”330 Similarly, a study analyzing 2017 data from Dutch prisons found
evidence that “sustained, frequent visits are associated with the lowest risk of
reconviction.”331
The § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) decisions point to a need for data tracking the frequency and
nature of suspensions of visits, group programming, and forms of communication with the
outside world. One of the few investigations to focus on lockdowns highlighted this aspect
of their impact on prison life. In 2018, the District of Columbia Corrections Information
Council (CIC) surveyed people imprisoned at U.S. Penitentiary Atwater after reports of
frequent lockdowns.332 The two most frequent complaints about the impacts of lockdowns
were that “[i]t is difficult to communicate with home because of the lockdowns” and
“[l]ockdowns prevent programming.”333 Future research should develop metrics that track
the impact of restrictions within prisons on specific aspects of social contact, such as access
to family visits, phone calls, and group programming.
*

*

*

As of August 2022, the U.S. Sentencing Commission has a quorum for the first
time in over three years.334 In October 2022, the Commission published its priorities for
amendments to the Guidelines Manual and listed updates to Policy Statement § 1B1.13
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first.335As part of this effort, the Commission should develop a plan for an informed,
deliberate approach to assessing whether—and, if so, how—judges adjudicating sentence
reductions should take prison conditions into account.
To begin this process, the Commission should gather data on lockdowns, the
delivery of medical and mental healthcare, and social contact in BOP facilities. Although
the involvement of Congress and the BOP may become necessary for this project,336 the
Sentencing Commission, whose membership includes judges, is an appropriate entity for
laying out an initial account of the types of changes that occur within federal prisons and
how these changes might bear on sentencing purposes.
In the meantime, the Commission should update the Guidelines Manual so that the
scope of “Other Reasons” is the same for motions filed by the BOP and imprisoned people.
There is no reason why judges adjudicating § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions should apply a
more restrictive standard in cases where the BOP has acted affirmatively to accelerate a
person’s release. The Commission should therefore amend Policy Statement § 1B1.13 in a
manner that provides judges with broad discretion to interpret the “Other Reasons”
subcategory—in other words, the Commission should expand the standard applicable to
BOP motions to meet the scope for motions filed by imprisoned people. To do otherwise
would be inconsistent with the broad language of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)’s text and would
unnecessarily stunt the development of case law expounding the “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” standard before the Commission has time to make informed
recommendations.
Given that lockdowns are conducive to measurement by duration and indisputably
alter the experience of imprisonment, Congress, the BOP, and the Sentencing Commission
should also give serious consideration to using sentencing credits to award reductions for
time spent in facility- or unit-wide lockdowns. For aspects of prison that are less readily
measurable, the Sentencing Commission should explore providing judges with ranges of
recommended reductions.
Finally, whether or not the Commission ultimately decides to endorse the use of
reductions to respond to changed prison conditions, the Commission should work with the
BOP and/or Congress to develop recommendations for reducing significant fluctuations in
restrictions inside prisons. Any system of reductions will be underinclusive to a degree,
and the most impactful efforts therefore may be those that focus on understanding and
improving the administration of prisons.
CONCLUSION
The confluence of the FSA’s amendments to § 3582(c) and the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on prison life caused federal judges to examine the relationship
between changed prison conditions and punishment in a broader manner than they had
before. Comparing judges’ approaches in these cases reveals important system design
choices for sentencing frameworks and the challenges of each route. By reframing efforts
335
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to increase transparency as implicating the fairness of sentences, the rulings also point to
an urgent need for broad, ongoing flows of information regarding life inside prison.
For systems that choose to define imprisonment in a manner that treats prison
conditions as influencing punitive effect, the rulings make clear that granting reductions
comes with significant challenges. Quantifying how much particular changes alter punitive
effect is highly subjective, and there is a risk of inconsistent applications across cases.
Increased data collection surrounding restrictions such as lockdowns can help guide these
decisions.
The rulings also bear on the creation and implementation of second looks. Over the
past decade, a variety of proposals to authorize reconsideration of prison sentences have
emerged. These proposals are products of critical efforts to introduce new opportunities for
reconsideration into one of the world’s most punitive criminal legal systems. The rulings
discussed in this Article suggest that, because second looks occur when previously
unknowable information about a person’s term of imprisonment is available,337 those
crafting second looks should anticipate the introduction of such information and provide
thoughtful guidance in advance.

See Dolovich, supra note 270, at 885 (“A judicial decision upholding, say, a sentence of life in prison
for murder is made before the sentence is served and is typically made with little or no attention to the
conditions under which the offender will serve the time. But that offender will be in state custody for years
and even decades after the habeas court has affirmed the sentence, and over that time he or she may endure
all manner of unspeakable conditions.”); c.f. Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 288 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“There is no accepted mechanism, however, for [judges] to take into account, when sentencing
a defendant, whether the time in prison will or should be served in solitary.”).
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